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GU WEIXIA*
Piercing the Veil of Arbitration Reform in China:
Promises, Pitfalls, Patterns, Prognoses, and Prospects
The promulgation of the China Arbitration Law in 1994 largely reformed and gave
shape to the modern Chinese arbitration regulatory framework. However, since then, there
has been little legislative improvement in meeting the changing needs. Instead, judicial ef-
forts by China’s Supreme People’s Court and institutional initiatives by Chinese arbitration
commissions have further refined and internationalized the Chinese arbitration system. Re-
cent years have witnessed many changes in the Chinese arbitration landscape, particularly
the formation, expansion, and complication of the Chinese arbitration market. This Article
first critically examines the current regulatory framework and special features of the Chinese
arbitration system, many of which promised in the China Arbitration Law and often referred
to as “arbitration with Chinese characteristics.” It then analyzes comprehensively arbitral
developments of the past decade in order to pierce the veil of arbitration reform in China,
highlighting the pitfalls, patterns, prognoses, and prospects. Finally, this Article identifies
the “essential” and “highly recommended” ingredients in prospective reform proposals and
examines the extent to which such proposals can actually transform China into a favorable
international arbitration forum.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1978, when China entered the era of “reform and opening up,” the drive toward
economic modernization through the policy of attracting foreign investment has been press-
ing. Over the past three decades, in tandem with increased trade and investment opportuni-
ties, China has witnessed a corresponding rise in the number of commercial disputes. It has
been noted that among the various ways of settling business disputes in China, arbitration has
become a preferred means of resolving trade and investment disputes between Chinese and
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. E-mail: guweixia@hku.hk. The research lead-
ing to this article was financially supported by the Hong Kong Government Research Grants Council General
Research Fund (HKU 17617416). An earlier draft of this Article was presented at the conference, “The Devel-
oping World of Arbitration: A Comparative Study of Arbitration Reform in the Asia Pacific,” held at University
of Hong Kong, Oct. 27, 2015. I am grateful for the discussion of ideas with Professor Michael Palmer, Professor
Anselmo Reyes, Professor Leon Trakman, Dr. Liu Xiaochun, Mr. Chan Leng Sun, and other speakers at the
conference. I also wish to thank Professor Liu Xiaohong, Professor Lin Yanping, Professor Zhao Yun, Professor
Song Lianbin, Ms. Yue Jie, Dr. Chen Fuyong, Dr. Wang Qianhua, Dr. Wang Wenying, Dr. Zhao Jian and Mr.
Cao Lijun, for discussing earlier ideas and drafts with me. Tiffany Tam and Emily Chan are acknowledged for
their helpful research assistance.
1
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3183549 
foreign parties.1 Arbitration therefore plays an increasingly important role in the Chinese eco-
nomic and legal systems, providing foreign cooperative partners with the confidence and re-
assurance required to encourage trade and investment. 
The promulgation of the China Arbitration Law in 1994 (effective in 1995) largely re-
forms, and gives shape to, the modern Chinese arbitration regulatory framework. However,
there has been little legislative improvement since then in meeting the changing needs over
the past two decades. Instead, judicial efforts by China’s Supreme People’s Court and institu-
tional initiatives by Chinese arbitration commissions have helped further refine and interna-
tionalize the Chinese arbitration system. Recent years have seen many changes to the Chinese
arbitration landscape, particularly the formation and intensification of competition within the
arbitration market in China. 
This Article first examines the current regulatory framework and special features of the
Chinese  arbitration  system,  often  referred  to  as  “arbitration  with Chinese  characteristics”
(Part I). It then probes arbitral developments of the past decade (Part II), highlighting the pit-
falls, patterns, prognoses, and prospects of the arbitration reform in China (Part III). Finally,
this Article concludes by identifying the “essential” and “highly recommended” ingredients
in the prospective reform proposals of the Chinese arbitration system and analyzes the extent
to which these proposals can actually transform China into a favorable international arbitra-
tion forum (Part IV).
I. ARBITRATION WITH “CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS”
Arbitration in China is marked by a number of distinctive, and even “rigid,” features that
often catch seasoned practitioners unfamiliar with the system by surprise. The system is often
referred to as “arbitration with Chinese characteristics.”2 These “Chinese characteristics” be-
gin with the regulatory framework.
A. The Design and Regulatory Framework
1. Arbitration Law and Other Sources of Regulations
a. Arbitration Law
1  Weixia Gu, Arbitration in China, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ASIA 77, 78–79 (Shahla
F. Ali & Tom Ginsburg eds., 3d ed. 2013).
2   Gu Weixia,  Preface  to  GU WEIXIA,  ARBITRATION IN CHINA: REGULATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
AND PRACTICAL ISSUES, at vii, viii (2012).
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China follows the civil law tradition where statutes serve as the primary source of law. In
the field of arbitration, the Arbitration Law (AL) was adopted in August 1994 and came into
force in September 1995.3
The legislation is generally applicable to all arbitrations conducted within China over a
wide range of economic disputes on the basis of voluntary agreement to arbitrate. Divided
into eight chapters, it deals with the contents of arbitration agreements, the establishment of
arbitral  tribunals,  procedural  rules,  and  means  of  revocation  and  enforcement  of  arbitral
awards.4 The promulgation of the AL was fueled by the rapidly changing economic and legal
environment in China in the 1980s and early 1990s, when the outdated domestic arbitration
regime hindered  the  development  of  commercial  arbitration,  already increasingly  used  in
China, sparking calls for reform.5 
One point worth noting is that while the 1985 United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial  Arbitration (the
“Model Law”) was relied on for modernizing China’s arbitration regime, the Model Law has
never been adopted in China. Academic commentaries show that the Model Law had only
served as a guiding reference during the drafting stage of the AL.6 
b. State Council Regulations
For the purpose of implementing the 1994 AL, China’s Central  Government, or more
specifically  the State Council,  promulgated several rounds of notices that  formed another
source of arbitration regulations in China. In particular, these notices served to guide the es-
tablishment of Chinese city-based local arbitration commissions, which was provided for un-
der the 1994 AL and took shape only after the AL became effective in 1995.
3   Zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa (中华人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), 7  CHINA L. & PRAC. 23
(1994).
4   See id.
5   Katherine Lynch, The New Arbitration Law, 26 H.K.L.J. 104 (1996).
6   Shengchang Wang, The Globalization of Economy and China’s International Arbitration (Oct. 15, 2002) (pa-
per delivered at the Seminar on Globalization and Arbitration in Beijing, sponsored by the International Cham-
ber of Commerce (ICC) and the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC))
(on file with author).
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For example, a State Council Notice issued in 1996 (the “1996 Notice”)7 related to the ju-
risdiction of local arbitration commissions and entitled them to arbitrate foreign-related dis-
putes, a task which, prior to the promulgation of the AL, was monopolized by the China In-
ternational Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). By doing so, the “dual-
track” division of arbitration commissions in China under the AL on the basis of jurisdiction
bifurcation could be diluted.8 Some local arbitration commissions, such as the Beijing Arbi-
tration Commission (BAC), have since grown rapidly and accepted significant numbers of in-
ternational cases. Generally, however, foreign parties are reluctant to submit their disputes to
locally based arbitral bodies due to those bodies’ lack of experience with respect to handling
foreign-related arbitrations.  International  arbitrations are still  largely conducted before the
CIETAC, which continues to pose practical challenges to the State Council-led blurring-of-
jurisdiction motive. The issues concerning the dual-track division and competition between
the CIETAC and local arbitration commissions will be further examined in the following sub-
sections.
c. Judicial Interpretations
The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has taken up dual roles as both the highest judicial
organ and a de facto rulemaking power-holder in China through publication of judicial inter-
pretations (sifa jieshi).9 The SPC has from time to time formed the view that part of the AL is
too vague, and in order to fill the gap, it has issued many judicial interpretations relating to
the practice of arbitration. These interpretations have mostly taken the form of “replies” and
“notices,” and have been given by the SPC as directives to lower-level Chinese courts, to fa-
cilitate their handling of specific arbitration cases. These “directives” appeared rather sporad-
7   Guo wu yuan ban gong ting guan yu guan che shi shi zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa xu yao
ming que de ji ge wen ti de tong zhi (fa fa (1997) 4 hao) (国务院办公厅关于贯彻实施《中华人民共和国仲裁
法》需要明确的几个问题的通知) [Notice of the General Office of the State Council Regarding Some Prob-
lems Which Need to Be Clarified for the Implementation of the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the GENERAL OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL,  June 8, 1996, effective June 8, 1996)
(Lawinfochina).
8   Gu, supra note 1, at 82.
9   Zhong hua ren min gong he guo ren min fa yuan zu zhi fa (中华人民共和国人民法院组织法 Chinese law
name) [Organic Law of People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China],  (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980, revised in 1983 and 2006), art. 33 <Order No.
59 of the President of the People's Republic of China>. However, the scope of the SPC’s interpretative power is
not clearly defined between interpreting law and making law, save for the literal distinction that legislation is
the act of making a law, while interpretation is the act or process of ascertaining the meaning of existing laws.
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ically until they were most recently consolidated in 2006 in the SPC Interpretation on Certain
Issues Concerning the Application of the Arbitration Law (the “2006 SPC Interpretation”).10
The 2006 SPC Interpretation is widely regarded as a prelude to future amendments to the AL.
Its contents, which will be further discussed in this Article, are an indicator of the judiciary’s
attempt to further encourage, in a rather purposeful and liberal manner, the development of
arbitration in China in accordance with international norms and standards. 
d. Arbitration Commissions Rules
Unlike legislation and judicial interpretations, arbitration commission rules do not carry
the force of law under Chinese jurisprudence. However, as the Chinese arbitration system re-
quires that all arbitration cases be conducted in accordance with the rules of the chosen arbi-
tration commission,11 such rules are broadly regarded as part of the legal framework of arbi-
tration in China governing arbitral proceedings. 
As the earliest established arbitration institution in China, the CIETAC has played an ir-
replaceable role in the Chinese arbitration system. Since its inception in 1956, the CIETAC
has amended its rules on eight occasions, with the most recent amendment introduced in Jan-
uary  2015,  reflecting  the  international  trend of  enhancing flexibility  in  arbitration  proce-
dures.12 The CIETAC’s continuous efforts to attract bigger caseloads and improve competi-
tiveness may also be observed in the development of its own specialized arbitration rules. For
instance, the publication of the CIETAC’s Arbitration Rules for Financial Disputes is one of
the Commission’s attempts to expand its jurisdiction to cover a broader range of disputes and
to follow the international trend of treating financial disputes separately from general com-
mercial  disputes.13 The China Maritime Arbitration  Commission (CMAC), which handles
10   Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu shi yong zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa ruo gan wen ti de jie
shi (fa shi (2006) 7 hao) (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国仲裁法》若干问的解释（法释
（2006） 7 号) [SPC Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Arbitration Law (Court
Statement No. 7 of 2006)] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 26, 2005, effective Sept. 8, 2006) <
Court Statement No. 7 of 2006)>.
11   Zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa (中华人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), arts. 16, 18, reported in 7
CHINA L. & PRAC. 23 (1994).
12   The eight revisions date, respectively, to 1988, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2005, 2012, and 2014. See CHINA
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION CIETAC ARBITRATION RULES (rev’d Nov.
4, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=42&l=en.
13   See  CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION FINANCIAL DISPUTES
ARBITRATION RULES (rev’d  Nov.  4,  2014,  effective  Jan.  1,  2015),  http://www.cietac.org/index.php?
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maritime arbitration in China, has also revised its rules on several occasions. As with the CI-
ETAC rules, the CMAC’s most recently amended rules took effect in January 2015.14
Alongside the CIETAC and the CMAC, there are more than 200 city-based local arbitra-
tion commissions established as a result of the promulgation of the AL, each of which formu-
lates its own set of arbitration rules. Among them, the BAC, drawing from the experience of
both the CIETAC and international arbitral institutions, has been increasingly recognized as a
rising star of arbitration rulemaking in China. The BAC’s latest set of arbitration rules, featur-
ing more professional and autonomous arbitral  procedures, was revised in July 2014, and
took effect in April 2015.15 
e. International Agreements
Finally, international agreements also form part of the regulatory framework of arbitra-
tion in China. Pursuant to Chinese jurisprudence, in cases where provisions of the interna-
tional conventions signed by China are applicable, they will take precedence over counterpart
provisions contained in domestic legislation, save for the reservations that China made during
accession.16 With respect to arbitration, China acceded to the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”)17 in December
1986; the Convention remains the primary source of international regulation for China in the
enforcement of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards.18
m=Page&a=index&id=108&l=en 
14   See CHINA MARITIME ARBITRATION COMMISSION CMAC ARBITRATION RULES (rev’d Nov. 4, 2014, effec-
tive  Jan.  1,  2015),  http://www.cmac-sh.org/en/rules.asp.  http://www.cmac.org.cn/index.php?m=Page&a=in-
dex&id=282&l=en
15   BEIJING ARBITRATION COMMISSION ARBITRATION RULES (rev’d Jul. 9, 2014, effective Apr. 1, 2015), http://
arbitrator.bjac.org.cn/page/data_dl/bjac_guize_en.pdf [hereinafter BAC ARBITRATION RULES].
16   Zhong hua ren min gong he guo min fa tong ze (中华人民共和国民法通则 ) [General Principles of Civil
Law of the People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12,
1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 142 <Order No. 37 of the President of the People’s Republic of China>.
17   Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
330 U.N.T.S. 4739 [hereinafter New York Convention].
18   Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu zhi xing wo guo jia ru de cheng ren ji zhi xing wai guo zhong cai cai jue
gong yue de tong zhi (fa fa (1987) 5 hao) (最高人民法院关于执行我国加入的《承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公
约》的通知（法发（1987）5号) [Decision on China Joining the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Court Issuance No. 5 of 1987)] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l Peo-
ple’s Cong., Dec. 2, 1986, effective Apr. 22, 1987) < No. 5 [1987] of the Supreme People's Court>. China made
two reservations during its accession to the New York Convention in 1986. First, the application of the Conven-
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2. Dual-Track Mechanism
The Chinese arbitration system adopts a dual-track distinction, under which different pro-
cedures and standards of judicial review apply to the domestic and foreign-related arbitration
regimes, respectively. Arbitration in China has been clearly developed from these two tracks,
with different arbitral procedures for each, and different standards of judicial review applying
to each. 
While basic laws in China do not provide an explicit  definition of the term “foreign-re-
lated,”  a definition may be inferred from article 178 of the Several Opinions on the Imple-
mentation of the General Principles of Civil Law, which provides that a foreign element will
exist where:
(a) one party or both parties to the contract are foreign entities, foreign legal 
persons, or stateless persons; or
(b) the subject matter of the contract is located in a foreign country; or
(c) the act which gives rise to, modifies, or extinguishes the rights and obligations
under the contract, occurs in a foreign country.19
Besides the three criteria above, cases involving parties from Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwan are broadly referred to as foreign-related. This situation remains unchanged with 
regard to Hong Kong and Macau in the post-handover period. Thus, an arbitration would be 
deemed to be “foreign-related” where it relates to disputes arising out of a contract with a 
foreign element.
Although the AL covers both domestic and foreign arbitration and applies equally to both
regimes, there are provisional gaps differentiating the two tracks, effectively giving foreign
arbitration a more favorable treatment. Chapter VII (articles 65–73) of the AL specifically
regulates the foreign-related track and prescribes a series of privileges exclusively reserved to
tion in China must be based on “reciprocity,” i.e., where a country is not a member state to the New York Con-
vention, for recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in China, parties will have to rely on relevant judi-
cial assistance agreements which China has entered into with the relevant country or region. Second, the arbitral
award seeking enforcement in China must arise out of a “commercial” dispute, with the exception of investment
disputes between foreign investors and the host nation which receives the investment. See Gu, supra note 1, at
85–86.
19   Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu guan che zhi xing zhong hua ren min gong he guo min fa tong ze ruo gan
wen ti de yi jian (最高人民法院关于贯彻执行《中华人民共和国民法通则》若干问题的意见 ) [Several
Opinions on the Implementation of the General Principles of Civil Law] (adopted by the Sup. People’s Ct. , Jan.
26, 1988, effective Apr. 2, 1988), art. 178, CLI.3.3689(EN) (translation by the author).
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foreign-related arbitrations, including greater freedom enjoyed by foreign-related arbitration
commissions  when deciding  upon their  own organizational  structure,20 more  flexible  and
user-friendly rules governing the application for interim measures of protection, etc.  21 More-
over, Chapter VII of the AL also provides less stringent qualification requirements for for-
eigners applying to serve as arbitrators in China.
The most significant disparity between the two tracks lies in the enforcement of arbitral
awards. While the grounds for the exercise of judicial supervision in setting aside, or denying
the enforcement of, foreign and foreign-related arbitral awards in China, in line with Article
V(2)  of  the  New  York  Convention  and  international  practice,  are  limited  to  procedural
grounds,22 the review of domestic awards involves even substantive matters, such as effects
of the evidence on which the award is based and mistakes in application of the law.23 The
broad power held by the courts to “refuse enforcement” of domestic arbitral awards has, how-
ever,  been  narrowed  with  the  most  recent  amendments  to  China’s  Civil  Procedure  Law
(CPL), effective on January 1, 2013.24 Under the most recent CPL amendments, “incorrect
application  of  the  law”  was  removed  as  a  ground  for  refusing  enforcement  of  domestic
awards, such that the substantive aspects of the review are now curbed.25 While substantive
20   Pursuant to article 66 of the AL, there is no exact limit for the number of members on a foreign-related arbi-
tration commission. In contrast, article 12 limits the number of members on a local arbitration commission to
sixteen. Zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa (中华人民共和国仲裁法 ) [Arbitration Law] (promul-
gated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 66, reported in
7 CHINA L. & PRAC. 23 (1994).
21   The relevant rules for domestic arbitrations are stipulated in article 46 of the AL, while that for foreign-re -
lated arbitrations are in article 68. Id.
22   Arbitration Law, Aug. 31, 1994, arts. 70–71 (referring to Zhong hua ren min gong he gong min shi su song fa
(中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure Law] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 260(1), <Order No. 44 of the President of the People’s Republic of
China >.
23   Id. art. 58.
24   Within the dual-track enforcement for domestic and foreign-related arbitral awards, there seems to be further
bifurcation in the domestic track. Article 58 of the Arbitration Law provides for grounds to “set aside” (chexiao)
a domestic arbitral award, while article 213 of the pre-amended Civil Procedure Law provides for grounds of
“refusing to enforce” (buyu zhixing) a domestic arbitral award. The latter ground, which includes both eviden-
tiary-related grounds and the ground of incorrect application of the law, was broader than the former prior to the
amendments. 
25   Zhong hua ren min gong he guo min shi su song fa (2012 xiu zheng) (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法（2012
修正）) [Civil Procedure Law (2012 Amendment)] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug.
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grounds relating to the correctness of evidence still  remain,  the broad ground of “insuffi-
ciency of the main evidence” was replaced by two grounds of “fabrication” and “withholding
of main evidence,”26 both of which carry higher standards of burden of proof than the previ-
ous “insufficiency” ground. In narrowing down the substantive power of the courts in judicial
review of domestic arbitration, the 2013 CPL amendments are praiseworthy as they align the
power of the courts to “refuse enforcement” (buyu zhixing) with their power to “set aside”
(chexiao) domestic awards under the AL;27 the reform has been generally welcomed by arbi-
tration scholars and practitioners. However, as substantive grounds are still available for re-
view of domestic arbitral awards, unequal treatment still exists with respect to the two tracks. 
Apart  from the inequality in the grounds of review, the SPC has further introduced a
“pre-reporting system” in the procedure of review, which exclusively caters to the enforce-
ment of foreign and foreign-related arbitral awards.28 This system requires that only after the
SPC has confirmed that the foreign and foreign-related arbitral awards can be denied enforce-
mentmay lower-level courts refuse recognition or enforcement of foreign-related and foreign
arbitral agreements and awards in China.29 Accordingly, a negative enforcement ruling made
31, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), art. 237(2), < Order No. 59 of the President of the People’s Republic of China
>.
26   Id. The two new grounds under the amended CPL are “the evidence on which an arbitration case is adjudi-
cated is forged” and “the opposing party withholds any evidence from the arbitral institution, which suffices to
affect the fairness of the awards.”
27   Id.
28   Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu ren min fa yuan chu li yu she wai zhong cai ji wai guo zhong cai shi xiang
you guan wen ti de tong zhi (fa fa (1995) 18 hao) (最高人民法院关于人民法院处理与涉外仲裁及外国仲裁
事项有关问题的通知（法发（1995）8 号) [SPC Notice on Some Issues Concerning Foreign Arbitration and
Arbitration in Foreign Countries (Court Issuance No. 18 of 1995)] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Aug.
28, 1995, effective Aug. 28, 1995) <Court Issuance No. 18 of 1995>; Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu cheng
ren he zhi xing wai guo zhong cai cai jue shou fei ji shen cha qi xian wen ti de gui ding (fa shi (1998) 28 hao)
(最高人民法院关于承认和执行外国仲裁裁决收费及审查期限问题的规定（法释（1998）28 号) [SPC No-
tice on the Fee and Time Limit of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards (Court Explana-
tion No. 28 of 1998)] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 21, 1998, effective Nov. 21, 1998) < Court
Explanation No. 28 of 1998>; Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu ren min fa yuan che xiao she wai zhong cai cai
jue you guan shi xiang de tong zhi (fa (1998) 40 hao) (最高人民法院关于人民法院撤销涉外仲裁裁决有关事
项的通知（法（1998）40 号) [SPC Notice on Some Issues Concerning Setting Aside Arbitration Awards Re-
lated to Foreign Elements by the People’s Court (Court Issuance No. 40 of 1998)]  (promulgated by the Sup.
People’s Ct., Apr. 23, 1998, effective Apr. 23, 1998) < Court Issuance No. 40 of 1998>.
29   See sources cited supra note 28
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by the courts at the lower level, but not a positive one, must be subject to “pyramidal scru-
tiny” by the higher level. The “negative ruling” by the mid-level judiciary will even be re-
ported all the way to the highest judiciary (i.e. SPC). As such, a refusal or delay in handling
enforcement matters of foreign-related or foreign arbitration would be deemed exceptional
rather than usual. The “pre-reporting system” aims to prevent local protectionist influences
over arbitration enforcement and to improve China’s image in international arbitration where
the SPC has the final control over non-domestic arbitration review.30 On the other hand, the
scheme has been criticized as having overlooked the interests  of domestic arbitration and
even aggravating the dual-track inequality.31
In terms of arbitration institutions, there were two different types of arbitration commis-
sions catering to the two tracks. As discussed earlier, foreign-related arbitration cases used to
be monopolized by the CIETAC and the CMAC until the jurisdiction was merged under the
1996 State Council Notice. Hence, there is no longer a jurisdictional bifurcation predicated
on the two types of institutions. However, in practice, it is still difficult for local Chinese ar-
bitration commissions to compete with the CIETAC, which has accumulated much experi-
ence and expertise over the years in handling sophisticated international commercial arbitra-
tion matters. The competition among various arbitration institutions in China will be further
investigated in the following Part II.C. 
B. The Arbitration Institution System
These  “Chinese  characteristics”  also  include  the  institution-monopolized  framework,
where only institutional arbitration is allowed in China.
1. Institution Arbitration Only
Articles 16 and 18 of the AL require that an arbitration agreement contain a designated
arbitration institution, otherwise it is invalid.32 As such, an arbitration agreement submitting
disputes to ad hoc arbitration would not be valid in China. Relatedly, an award made through
ad hoc arbitration would not be enforceable in China following an invalid arbitration agree-
ment under articles 58, 63, 70, and 71 of the AL. In practice, aside from legal rigidities, there
have been cases where the Chinese judiciary struck down arbitration agreements providing
30   Wang Shengchang, “The Arbitration Agreement and Its Validity Determination” (Zhongcai xieyi ji qi xiaoli
queding), in SYMPOSIUM ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE TAIWAN STRAITS 39
(CIETAC ed., 2001). (China Law Press, 2001), pp. 3-40, at 39.
31   Gu, supra note 1, at 118.
32   Arbitration Law, Aug. 31, 1994, arts. 16, 18. 
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for ad hoc arbitration in China, for example, the SPC’s ruling in  People’s Insurance Com-
pany of China, Guangzhou v. Guanghope Power in 2003.33
An issue worth noting is whether arbitrations conducted by foreign arbitration institutions
seated in China are permitted or prohibited, as the Chinese legislature has not explicitly stated
its stance on such practice in the AL.34 In this respect, for the establishment of arbitration
commissions in China, Chapter II of the AL makes it clear that commissions are required to
be organized by local  people’s governments,  registered with local departments  of justice,
conform to a number of constitutional requirements,  and be subject to supervision by the
China Arbitration Association.35 Chapter VII of the AL also provides for foreign-related arbi-
tration commissions in China to be established by the China Chamber of International Com-
merce, although their organization must also conform to the requirements set out in Chapter
II referred to above.36 Accordingly, it is difficult to see how foreign arbitral bodies can be
squeezed comfortably, if at all, into the framework constructed by these provisions. The issue
has been much debated, with the concentration on whether an arbitration following the Rules
of International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration (often referred to as “ICC arbi-
tration”) can be lawfully conducted within China and produce an enforceable award.37 Practi-
cally  speaking, arbitration agreements  providing for ICC arbitration seated in China have
been declared void by Chinese courts, for example, the Wuxi Intermediate People’s Court’s
ruling in Züblin International v. Wuxi Woco-Tongyong Rubber Engineering in 2006.38 Hence,
33   Zhong guo ren min bao xian gong si guang dong sheng fen gong si yu guang dong guang he dian li you xian
gong si deng bao xian he tong jiu fen an (中国人民保险公司广东省分公司与广东光合电力有限公司等保险
合同纠纷案) [People’s Ins. Co. of China, Guangzhou v. Guanghope Power et al.], <Min Si Zhong Zi] No. 29 of
2003 （民四仲字（2003）第 29号）(Sup. People’s Ct. Oct. 31, 2003); cited in Daniel R. Fung and Wang
Sheng Cheng, Arbitration in China: A Practical Guide (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), para. 2-18.
34   “Conducting arbitration” in this context means to choose China as the seat  of arbitration, regardless  of
whether the hearings take place in China. 
35   Arbitration Law, Aug. 31, 1994, art. 15.
36   Id. art. 65.
37   See discussions on “ICC Arbitration in China” in Roundtable on Arbitration and Conciliation Concerning
China,  in  NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND:  ICCA CONGRESS
SERIES NO. 12, at 19 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2005).
38   De guo xu pu lin guo ji you xian ze ren gong si yu wu xi wo ke tong yong gong cheng xiang jiao you xian
gong si shen qing que ren zhong cai xie yi xiao li an (德国旭普林国际有限责任公司与无锡沃可通用工程橡
胶有限公司申请确认仲裁协议效力案) [Züblin International GmbH v. Wuxi Woco-Tongyong Rubber Engi-
neering Co.], (Wuxi  Intermediate People’s Court, July 19, 2006),  cited in Nadia Darwazeh & Friven Yeoh,
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the requisite element of a “designated arbitration institution” under the AL was traditionally
deemed to encompass only Chinese arbitration commissions until it  was most recently re-
laxed through a couple of cases,39 the significance of which will be discussed below in rela-
tion to the issue of foreign institutional arbitration seated in China.
2. Proliferation of Arbitration Commissions and the Quest for Their 
Independence
Another controversial issue in the Chinese arbitration system is the proliferation of local
arbitration commissions and the associated quest for their independence. The promulgation of
the AL has impacted the arbitration sector (and industry) in several ways, among which there
are two most significant ways. 
First, according to article 10(1) of the AL, arbitration commissions may be established in
any Chinese city as long as the city can be divided into districts in an administrative sense. As
a result, arbitration commissions mushroomed across the nation following the promulgation
of the AL. For example,  both the BAC and the Shanghai Arbitration Commission (SAC)
were established in September 1995; the Hangzhou Arbitration Commission was established
in August 1996, while the Wuhan Arbitration Commission was set up in 1997.40 The list
keeps expanding, and indeed, in tandem with the urbanization wave in China in the past two
decades, accompanied by a growing competition among Chinese cities, there is a rising trend
in the establishment of city-based local arbitration commissions, the total number of which is
still  growing in recent  years.  In 2012, there were a  total  of  219 arbitration  commissions
throughout China;41 the number increased to 225 in 2013,42 235 in 2014,43 and to as many as
244 in 2015.44 The widespread local arbitration commissions face, however, a certain amount
of criticism. Many of them actually cater to administrative needs instead of satisfying the ac-
tual market demand for commercial dispute resolution. Hence, these commissions may not
Recognition and Enforcement of Awards Under the New York Convention: China and Hong Kong Perspectives ,
6 J. INT’L ARB. 837, 841–42 (2008).
39   The query as to whether ICC arbitration seated in China can produce valid and enforceable awards in China
has been revisited by some recent judgments. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
40   See the official websites of the Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Wuhan Arbitration Commissions.
41   Song Lianbin et al.,  Annual Review of Commercial Arbitration,  in  COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
CHINA: AN ANNUAL REVIEW AND PREVIEW 1, 2 (Beijing Arbitration Commission Institute of Advanced Legal
Studies ed., 2013).
42   Song Lianbin, Shen Hongyu & Xiao Fang, supra note 42, at 1, 1 (2014).
43   Song Lianbin, Yang Ling & Chen Xijia, supra note 42, at 1, 1 (2015).
44   Song Lianbin, Fu Panfeng & Chen Xijia, supra note 42, at 1, 1 (2016).
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have a sufficient caseload to support their operation, facing the reality of “looking for rice to
cook.”45 The insufficient caseload of quite a few local arbitration commissions negatively in-
fluences their independence and competitiveness, as will be further examined in this Article. 
Second, while the AL intended to cultivate the independence of Chinese arbitration com-
missions, there remains a gap between the legislative objective and the practical reality. Prior
to the promulgation of the AL, domestic arbitration in China was essentially a system of ad-
ministration adjudication. Established within the administrative bodies and following organic
administrative rules, the then domestic arbitration commissions were in fact administrative
agencies  affiliated  with,  and subordinate  to,  their  relevant  superiors  in  the administrative
ranks.46 The lack of independence of the domestic arbitration system not only reduced work
efficiency, but also compromised the confidence of public and foreign investors in arbitration
as a means of commercial dispute resolution. The Chinese legislature recognized the problem
of administrative encroachment on domestic arbitration commissions, and, in addition to leg-
islatively fostering the mushrooming of city-based local arbitration commissions in order to
cater to the market economy and increase the commercial caseload, it promulgated the AL
with the aim of boosting the independence of these commissions. Yet, recent in-depth investi-
gations and empirical studies show that the reality does not always live up to the AL’s objec-
tives and expectations. The quest for independence of local arbitration commissions newly
formed after the promulgation of the AL is therefore put into question. 
Articles 8 and 14 of the AL state that arbitration in China should be conducted in accor-
dance with laws and independently, without interference from government, social organiza-
tions, or individuals. Unfortunately, the lack of specific implementation rules in the legisla-
tion safeguarding the “independence” of arbitration commissions leaves room for ancillary
rules which may carry opposite effects. In accordance with a State Council notice in 1995,47
the establishment and the operation of local arbitration commissions in China are to be super-
vised by the local government’s legislative affairs office where the commission is located and
registered.48 The local legislative affairs office, however, becomes the leading department,
45   GU, supra note 2, at 107.
46   Id. at 102–08.
47   As previously discussed, State Council notices are deemed to be an importance source of regulation in the
Chinese arbitration system.
48   Guo wu yuan ban gong ting guan yu jin yi bu zuo hao chong xin zu jian zhong cai ji gou gong zuo de tong
zhi (guo ban fa (1995) 38 hao) (国务院办公厅关于进一步做好重新组建仲裁机构工作的通知（国办发
（1995）38 号 ) [Notice on Furthering the Work of Restructuring the Arbitration Institutions (State Council
General Office Issuance No. 38 of 1995)] (promulgated by the General Office of the St. Council, May 22, 1995,
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deciding on staffing and other important matters of development of the respective arbitration
commission.49 As a result, the majority of leading roles in local arbitration commissions is as-
sumed by local government officials. In this respect, two national surveys and empirical stud-
ies were conducted by the BAC in 2006 and 2007. The 2006 survey showed that 73.9% of the
personnel of the ninety-eight local arbitration commissions interviewed were hired by the ad-
ministrative organ; and the 2007 survey, which targeted seventy-three local arbitration com-
missions, found that 69.3% of the staff were associated with the local government.50 The AL
requirement that legal and economic trade professionals should make up no less than two
thirds of the members of an arbitration commission is seldom followed.51 Against this back-
drop, whether a local arbitral commission can operate independently is largely an issue of the
local  administrative  attitude  towards arbitration.  In this  respect,  the BAC benefits  greatly
from the “non-interference” approach by the Beijing municipal government which puts for-
ward the BAC as a rising star on the Chinese arbitration market.52
The source of finance is another important determinant of a commission’s independence.
Although under the present system not all arbitration commissions are financially sponsored
by the local state treasury,53 it does not necessarily follow that such commissions are finan-
cially independent. For those local arbitration commissions that can sustain themselves by
making satisfactory profits from the collection of arbitral service fees, the profits earned may
effective May 22, 1995) < State Council General Office Issuance No. 38 of 1995>.
49   Hongsong Wang, Existing Problems of the Arbitration Law and Its Reform Suggestions, 2 ARB. BEIJING 21
(2005) 52.
50   Chen Fuyong (陈福勇), Wo guo zhong cai ji gou xian zhuang shi zheng yan jiu (我国仲裁机构现状实证研
究) [Empirical Studies into Arbitration Commissions in China], 2 FA XUE YAN JIU (ER QI) (《法学研究》第
二期) [LEGAL STUD.] 81 (2009), at 85-86.
51   Id.
52   Beijing Arbitration Commission (北京仲裁委员会), Bei jing zhong cai wei yuan hui 2013 nian gong zuo
zong jie  (北京仲裁委员会 2013年工作总结 ) [Working Report of the Beijing Arbitration Commissions in
2013], http://www.bjac.org.cn/page/gybh/sznzj.html http://www.bjac.org.cn/page/gybh/2013zj.html (last visited
Oct. 24, 2017).
53   There are different ways of classifying institutions. For example, for-profit and nonprofit institutions, admin-
istrative and non-administrative institutions. See She hui tuan ti deng ji guan li tiao lie (社会团体登记管理条
例) [Regulation on Registration and Administration of Social Organizations] (promulgated by the St. Council,
Oct. 25, 1998, effective Oct. 25, 1998), art. 2, <Order No. 250 of the State Council of the People's Re-
public of China>. Arbitration commissions under the cap of “institutions (shiye danwei)” are financially spon-
sored by the state treasury. 
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still undergo administrative scrutiny. As for local commissions that are not self-sufficient but
need to rely on the financial support of local governments for caseload and survival, adminis-
trative interference is more evident.54 
The above discussion highlights two challenges faced by the local arbitration commis-
sions in China in their quest for independence. On the one hand, the effect of the legislative
reform is often limited by the lack of detailed implementing rules. On the other hand, in light
of a long history of administrative encroachment in the arbitration industry (particularly do-
mestic arbitration) prior to the AL, there is a limited extent to which legislative reforms may
improve the way local arbitration commissions and stakeholders are accustomed to acting in
practice. Nonetheless, it is encouraging to see that some better-developed local arbitral com-
missions have taken the initiative to address the problem, with the hope of winning the confi-
dence and recognition of both national and international communities.  As outlined above,
thanks to the liberal attitude of the Beijing municipal government, the BAC had by and large
achieved independence by 2006.55 The BAC has further retained a professional and academic
presence in its management committee. Even after several rounds of changes to the manage-
ment committee, this feature is still well maintained.56 The BAC’s experience will be further
discussed in the Part IV.B of the Article.
3. Panel Arbitrator System: Appointment, Qualifications, and 
Performance
As has been reiterated, a distinctive feature of the Chinese arbitration system is that it is
institution based. In fact, not only is there a requirement of having a designated arbitration
commission in the arbitration agreement, but the appointment of arbitrators in China is also
closely tied in with this institutional distinction. Under the panel arbitrator system in China,
instead of enjoying full freedom in deciding on the criteria and the rules of appointment of
the prospective arbitrators (as international arbitration norms would prescribe),57 parties in
China are restricted to appointing arbitrators from a panel list maintained by the relevant arbi-
tration commission which administers the case.58 
54   GU, supra note 2, at 106–07.
55   Beijing Arbitration Commission, supra note 53.
56   Id.
57   Arthur L. Marriott, Some Brief Observations on the Consultation of the Arbitral Tribunal, in IMPROVING THE
EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS:  40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION, ICCA SERIES NO. 9, at 320, 324–25 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1999).
58   Though the panel system is not expressly provided for in the Arbitration Law, it may be inferred from articles
11 and 13 of the AL.  See GU WEIXIA, ARBITRATION IN CHINA: REGULATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
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The panel system in arbitrator appointment has been criticized as seriously infringing
upon party autonomy and denting confidence in the impartiality of Chinese arbitration. This
is particularly detrimental given the resilience of personal relations and networks (guanxi) ex-
isting within the operation of the closed-panel arbitral tribunal.59 As parties are obliged to
choose arbitrators from the panel list, personal relations within the chosen tribunal may be
delicate since most of the panel arbitrators are drawn from among internal staff members of
the administering arbitration commission or government officials who are acquainted with
one another and live in the same local community.60 Staff and official arbitrators, afraid of
breaking personal ties, tend to accommodate the “amicable” majority opinion within the tri-
bunal.61 The performance as well as the impartiality of the arbitrators under the panel system
are therefore compromised under the panel arbitrator system. 
As for the qualifications of arbitrators, there are requirements both at the legislative level
(set by the AL) and the institutional level (set by each individual arbitration commission). At
the legislative level, which applies universally across the nation, article 13 of the AL sets
forth some general moral and professional prerequisites for becoming an arbitrator in China:
(a) An arbitrator must be a morally unimpeachable person who is regarded as upright and im-
partial by the public; (b) He/she must have sufficient number of years of expertise in some
special area such as law or trade and economics, with “expertise” meaning at least eight years
of work experience as a staff member on an arbitration commission, as a lawyer or judge, or
possessing a senior professional title in a law school or in the field of economics and trade.62 
Comparative studies show that China is among the few jurisdictions in the world that set
a high level of professional qualifications of arbitrators on behalf of the appointing parties.63
On the other hand, the appointment of foreign arbitrators is not subject to article 13 restric-
tions on “expertise” and “established years,” and there are no specific qualification required
AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 124–25 (2012). 
59   GU, supra note 2, at 131–33, 136–41.
60   Id. at 142–48.
61   Id. See also Gu, supra note 1, at 107.
62   Zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa (中华人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 13, reported in 7 CHINA
L. & PRAC. 23 (1994).
63   For example, to be an arbitrator in Taiwan, candidates must practice as a lawyer, judge, or accountant for
more than five years. Article 6 of the Taiwan Arbitration Act (1998), available at http://www.arbitration.org.tw/
law01-en.php (accessed Oct. 24, 2017)
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of foreigners (including permanent residents of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan64) to serve as
arbitrators in China.65 Compared to domestic appointments, the criteria for appointment of
foreign arbitrators are thus more relaxed. It is believed that, as in the case of the dual-track di-
vision where more favorable treatment is reserved to the foreign-related track, the qualifica-
tions of arbitrators on different tracks are also designed for the purpose of facilitating interna-
tionalization of China’s foreign-related arbitrations.66 At the institutional level, each individ-
ual arbitral commission, on the basis of the AL requirements, then further develops its own
qualifications for appointing arbitrators. As such, there is no uniform standard for recruiting
arbitrators  among  the  hundreds  of  arbitration  commissions  across  the  country.  Empirical
studies show that the BAC’s panel list is different from that of the CIETAC, which is in turn
different from those of other leading local arbitration commissions in the country such as the
Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Wuhan Arbitration Commissions.67 Echoing the insti-
tutional feature of the Chinese arbitration system, the AL requirements are just minimum
standards, leaving the final criteria of appointment of arbitrators for the individual arbitration
commissions to decide.
C. Relationship with the Court
While arbitration commissions have paramount importance due to the institution-based
system of Chinese arbitration, the role that courts play in the Chinese arbitration system is far
from negligible for the following reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, courts, in particular the
SPC, have the power to issue judicial interpretations, which form an important source of arbi-
tration regulations in China. The significance of these judicial interpretations in enhancing
and reforming the Chinese arbitration system will be further discussed below in Part II.B.
Second, courts play what some authors term a “supportive” role toward arbitration.68 They
possess the sole power to grant and enforce interim measures of protection to assist arbitral
proceedings in China, which include property and evidence preservation orders upon party’s
and/or arbitral tribunal’s request.69 Last but not least, courts play a “supervisory” role in arbi-
tration. They exercise a final check over arbitral jurisdiction through ruling on whether the ar-
64   Hong Kong-, Macau-, and Taiwan-based arbitrators are considered foreign arbitrators, and cases involving el-
ements from these three jurisdictions are considered foreign-related cases.
65   Arbitration Law, Aug. 31, 1994, art. 67.
66   Gu, supra note 1, at 104–05.
67   GU, supra note 2, at 126–31.
68   For example, see JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA ¶¶ 98–99 (2d ed. 2008). 
69   Arbitration Law, Aug. 31, 1994, art. 68.
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bitration agreement or clause is existent or valid.70 More powerfully, courts scrutinize arbitral
awards. The heavier standard of scrutiny applied by Chinese courts in reviewing domestic ar-
bitral awards, as compared to foreign-related awards, has been highlighted previously in this
Article. 
II. RECENT REFORMS IN CONTEXT
For the past decade (2006–2016), reforms of the Chinese arbitration system have been
carried out mainly through two channels: (a) judicial initiatives and (b) competition among
arbitration commissions in the arbitration market. Furthermore, there is great need to reform
the AL.
A. Model Law Impact and Legislative Reform
As previously mentioned, the Model Law has never been adopted in China, although the
1985 version of the Model Law served as a guiding reference during the drafting stage of the
AL in 1994. As an apparent obstacle to the Chinese arbitration system and its development,
the AL has proved unable to cope with practical needs. Legislative reforms have been pro-
posed to remedy the regulatory defects. It is apparent that although the appeal for reform has
been strong over the past decade (2006–2016), no definite timetable has been set in China’s
national legislative agenda for revisions.71
It seems that now the conditions are ripe for a legislative reform to take place. First, after
more than two decades of practice under the AL, positive and negative lessons can been
drawn from the experience of both the CIETAC and other leading local arbitration commis-
sions such as the BAC.72 Second, SPC judicial interpretations of the AL and the SPC’s re-
forms of the judiciary over the past few decades have prepared the courts to embrace a more
pro-arbitration approach.73 Last but not the least, there has been a vigorous growth in arbitra-
70   Id. arts. 20, 26.
71   See Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu shi yong zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa ruo gan wen ti de
jie shi (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国仲裁法》若干问题的解释 ) [Interpretation of the SPC
Concerning Some Issues on Application of the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promul-
gated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 23, 2006, effective Sep. 8, 2006) <Interpretation No. 7 [2006] of the
Supreme People’s Court> (embarking on a nation-wide appeal for the legislative reform of the arbitration law in
China) (see Part II.B.1). Unfortunately, thus far, there have only been updates to the 2013 Civil Procedure Law
with respect to judicial review over arbitral awards, as discussed above. 
72   See discussion infra Part II.C.
73   The SPC judicial interpretations of the AL will be examined in Part II.B below.
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tion talents, scholars, and professionals in China, culminating in the formation of a strong ar-
bitration community.74 Details of the legislative reform will be further analyzed in Part IV.A.
B. Judicial Support over the Past Decade
1. Judicial Interpretation of the Arbitration Law in 2006
One aspect of judicial initiatives on arbitration is the issuance of judicial interpretations
by courts, most notably, the 2006 Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the Application
of the Arbitration Law (the “2006 SPC Interpretation”). This judicial interpretation, issued on
August 23, 2006, is the most recent, most comprehensive, and most systematic attempt by the
SPC to codify its past judicial opinions on aspects of arbitral practice in China that are un-
mentioned or unclear in the AL.75
Most noticeably, parties are given greater drafting autonomy, where most of the drafting
pathologies involving “ambiguous and multiple arbitration commissions” would be deemed
remediable.76 For example, the parties’ choice of institutional arbitration rules is considered
as  their  selection  of  the  arbitral  institution  that  is  to  administer  those  chosen  arbitration
rules.77 As such, the new practice guides have enjoyed significant support by the highest Chi-
nese judiciary to arbitration. It is worth noting, however, that, prior to the issuance of the
2006 SPC Interpretation, a more liberal interpretative technique had been proposed in its draft
provisions (the “SPC Draft Provisions”) in 2004.78 Most “liberal” of all was its article 27,
74   Since its inception in 2004, the China Academy for Arbitration Law has become the leading forum for bring-
ing together arbitration talents and professionals throughout China. For more information, see Zhong guo zhong
cai fa xue yan jiu hui (中国仲裁法学研究会 ) [China Academy of Arbitration Law],  http://www.arbitra -
tion.org.cn/about/index.jhtml (last visited Oct 24. 2017).
75   For a detailed overview of the 2006 SPC Interpretation, see GU, supra note 2, at 74–83.
76   Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu shi yong zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa ruo gan wen ti de jie
shi (fa shi (2006) 7 hao) (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国仲裁法》若干问题的解释（法释
（2006）7 号) [SPC Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Arbitration Law (Court
Statement No. 7 of 2006)] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 26, 2005, effective Sept. 8, 2006), arts.
1–9, <Interpretation No. 7 [2006] of the Supreme People’s Court>.
77   Id. art. 4.
78   Guan yu shi yong zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa ruo gan wen ti de jie shi (zheng qiu yi jian
gao) (关于适用《中华人民共和国仲裁法》若干问题的解释（征求意见稿）) [Interpretations to Several Is-
sues on the Application of the China Arbitration Law (Draft Provisions for Opinion Solicitation)] (promulgated
by the Sup. People’s Ct., July 22, 2004) available at http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=124300 (ac-
cessed Oct 24. 2017)
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which allowed ad hoc arbitration agreements in China if both parties to the agreement are na-
tionals of member states of the 1958 New York Convention, and neither country prohibits the
practice of ad hoc arbitration.79 The provision was considered restrictive in that ad hoc arbi-
tration agreements between a Chinese party and a foreign party may still be excluded. How-
ever, the potential impact of the article would be far-reaching, that being the possible opening
up of ad hoc arbitral practice in China. With partial recognition of ad hoc arbitration agree-
ments in China, the SPC Draft Provisions, particularly article 27, had high expectation of be-
ing formally endorsed. This, however, did not happen, leaving the practice of ad hoc arbitra-
tion at the crossroads of the SPC-led arbitration reform. Moreover, the status of foreign insti-
tutional  arbitration seated in China was not clarified in this  significant SPC interpretative
document, an issue which has been, instead, dealt with by lower-level Chinese judiciaries in a
few recent cases, which I examine in Part II.B.2.
2. Most Recent Judgments Relaxing Foreign Institutional Arbitration 
Seated in China
Another impressive aspect of the judicial initiatives in reform is judgments rendered by
the Chinese judiciary (both the SPC and lower level courts) on whether parties may validly
select foreign institutional arbitrations seated in China. As mentioned above, the traditional
position seemed to be that such arbitration agreements would be invalid, and the resulting ar-
bitral awards would be unenforceable because the requirement of a “designated arbitration
commission” under the AL was deemed to be limited only to Chinese arbitration institu-
tions.80 A couple of recent cases have however pushed the boundary of this knowledge.
In April 2009, in the much-quoted, controversial judgment in Duferco SA v. Ningbo Art
& Craft Import & Export Corp., the Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court (in Zhejiang Prov-
ince) confirmed and enforced an arbitral award under the ICC Arbitration Rules by an arbitral
panel seated in Beijing. This was the first reported case of a Chinese court granting enforce-
ment of an ICC award made in China.81 The court confirmed the award and commented that it
was not to be categorized as a domestic award, but as a “non-domestic award” under the New
York Convention, and as such, it should be recognized and enforced pursuant to the Conven-
79   Id. art. 27.
80   See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
81   De gao gang tie gong si yu ning bo shi gong yi pin jin chu kou you xian gong si (德高钢铁公司与宁波市工
艺品进出口有限公司) [Duferco SA v. Ningbo Art & Craft Import & Export Corp.], [2008] Yong Zhong Jian
Zi No.4 ([2008]甬仲监字第 4 号)> (Ningbo Intermediate People’s Ct. Apr. 22, 2009).
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tion.82 However, it should be noted that in this case, the respondent had failed to raise its ju-
risdictional objection prior to the first hearing of the arbitral proceeding, and hence, had been
deemed to have waived the chance to challenge the validity of the arbitral agreement in a
timely manner.83 In the judgment, the Ningbo Intermediate Court decided the case on the ba-
sis of the respondent’s waiver, without any detailed discussion on the stance and validity of
ICC arbitration seated in China.84 Therefore, doubts and criticisms remain as to whether the
results would have been different had the respondent raised the objection to the validity of the
arbitration agreement in a timely manner, leaving room for challenges to the authority and
impact of this judgment. 
Most recently, in March 2013, the issue of arbitral awards rendered by foreign institu-
tional arbitration seated in China came up again in the Longlide Packaging Co. v. BP Agnati
S.R.L. case.85 In this case, the disputed arbitration clause provided that any dispute shall be
submitted to arbitration by the ICC Court of Arbitration and that the place of arbitration shall
be in Shanghai. The claimant disputed the validity of the agreement on three bases: First, the
ICC Court of Arbitration is not a “designated arbitration institution” in China. Second, allow-
ing the ICC to arbitrate a case seated in China would violate China’s public policy. Third, in
any event, the award should be considered as a domestic award in China such that the New
York Convention should not be applicable for its recognition and enforcement.86 The case
went before the Anhui Provincial Higher People’s Court, which consulted the SPC for a reply
on the three issues raised by the claimant. The SPC issued a reply, responding to the first is-
sue and upholding the validity of the arbitration agreement; the implication of which is that
the ICC Court of Arbitration, despite being a foreign arbitration institution, was accepted as a
82   The ruling has been described as a “helpful step in the right direction.” See First Reported Case of a China
ICC Award  Being  Enforced  in  China,  FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (Oct.  2009),  https://uk.practi-
callaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-500-3353?
transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 (accessed Oct. 24, 2017) 
83   There is a timing requirement under Article 20, para. 2 of the AL to raise jurisdictional challenge; that a court
shall not accept a party’s application to nullify an arbitration agreement where the party failed to raise its objec -
tion prior to the first hearing in the arbitration proceeding. 
84   Supra note 82.
85   An hui long li de bao zhuang yin shua you xian gong si yu BP Agnati S.R.L. ( 安徽龙利得包装印刷有限公
司与被申请人 BP Agnati S.R.L.) [BP Agnati S.R.L Longlide Packaging Co. v. BP Agnati S.R.L.] [2013] Wan
Min Er Ta Zi No. 00001 ([2013] 皖民二他字第 00001 号)> (Anhui Higher People’s Ct. Jan. 30, 2013).
86   Id, para 2.
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valid “designated arbitration institution.”87 The  SPC, however, did not go on to address the
second and third issues, such that the question of whether the current jurisprudence now ex-
tends to allow foreign arbitration institutions to administer arbitration in China is still unclear.
To sum up, the Chinese judiciary now seems to be more liberal with regard to foreign in-
stitutional arbitration seated in China. From the initial refusal by the Wuxi Intermediate Court
to recognize ICC arbitration in the Züblin case in 2006,88 to the Ningbo Intermediate Court’s
categorization of this type of arbitration as “non-domestic arbitration” in Duferco in 2009, to
the SPC’s acceptance in Longlide case of an ICC arbitration seated in China as a valid arbi-
tration  agreement in 2013, the  Chinese  judiciary has been broadening the institutional re-
quirement stipulated by articles 16 and 18 of the  AL such that the requirement is not re-
stricted to Chinese domestic arbitration commissions only. 
While the two more recent cases, Duferco and Longlide, exhibit judicial leniency towards
foreign institutional arbitration seated in China, uncertainty still looms over the highest Chi-
nese judiciary as to the official legality of foreign institutional arbitration seated in China. On
a separate note, the application of the New York Convention is limited to recognition and en-
forcement of arbitral awards from a “foreign” state.89 Although China made a “reciprocity”
reservation in its accession to the New York Convention,90 this reservation does not affect the
nature of the enforceable award in China under the Convention as entirely “foreign.”91 It is
87   Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu shen qing ren an hui sheng long li de bao zhuang yin shua you xian gong si
yu bei shen qing ren BP Agnati S.R.L. shen qing que ren zhong cai xie yi xiao li an de qing shi de fu han  (最高
人民法院关于申请人安徽省龙利得包装印刷有限公司与被申请人 BP Agnati S.R.L.申请确认仲裁协议效
力案的请示的复函) [Reply of the Supreme People’s Court to the Request for Instructions on Application for
Confirming the Validity of an Arbitration Agreement in the Case of Anhui Long Li De Packaging and Printing
Co. v. BP Agnati S.R.L.] [2013] Min Si Ta Zi No. 13 ([2013] 民四他字第 13号)> (Sup. People’s Ct. Mar. 25,
2013).
88   See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
89  The New York Convention, supra note 17, art. 1, para. 1, provides that “[t]he member State will apply the 
Convention only to recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of another contracting State.” 
See Status—Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), 
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last 
visited Oct. 24 2017).
90   See sources cited supra note 18, on the “reciprocity” reservation that China made during accession.
91  See Circular of Supreme People’s Court on Implementing Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign  Arbitral  Awards  Entered  by  China  (Dec.  31,  1986), available  at http://www.cietac.org/index.php?
m=Article&a=show&id=2413&l=en. Article 1 of the Circular provides that “[i]n accordance with the reciproc-
ity reservation statement made by China when entering the Convention, this Convention shall  apply to the
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therefore confusing and somewhat disappointing that the SPC failed to address or clarify the
issue of  whether ICC arbitral awards rendered in China should be categorized as “non-do-
mestic awards,” and hence failed to address  the  proper  scope and application of the New
York Convention in China.
C. The Competitive Arbitration Market
In addition to the judicial support of arbitration, the latest developments in the Chinese
arbitration system are also pushed by the wave of  increasing competition among different
Chinese arbitration  commissions,  which I  have  referred to as the “competitive arbitration
market.” 
As outlined previously, the landscape of arbitration institutions in China is mainly consti-
tuted by two forces. On the one hand, despite the jurisdictional merging after the 1996 State
Council Notice, the  CIETAC still dominates the foreign-related arbitration  market. On the
other hand, hundreds of local arbitration commissions have quickly proliferated after the pro-
mulgation of the AL. As one will have noticed from the multiple times the CIETAC is men-
tioned in this  Article, as the  most established arbitration institution in China, the  CIETAC
plays an irreplaceable role in the Chinese arbitration system though its role was recently chal-
lenged. The dramatic episode of the CIETAC split in 2013, one of the most important events
in changing the current dynamics of the Chinese arbitration landscape, shows that the Chi-
nese arbitration market is in fact not necessarily of a monopolistic nature. Local arbitration
commissions have also been behaving in an increasingly proactive and competitive manner in
recent years. They have been consistently updating their arbitration rules and pursuing other
innovative marketing initiatives to generate a new force of reform of the Chinese arbitration
system. 
1. The CIETAC Split in 2013
a. Relationship Between the CIETAC and Its Two Sub-commissions in 
Shenzhen and Shanghai
The key players in the episode of the CIETAC split are the CIETAC South China Sub-
commission (located in Shenzhen) and the Shanghai Sub-commission (located in Shanghai).
The two sub-commissions were established against the backdrop of China’s market economy
whereby Shenzhen had become the first “special economic zone” (jingji tequ) in China since
1980, and Shanghai  was the Chinese city  with the fastest economic growth and the largest
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award made in the territory of another contracting State.” Id.
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portion of foreign investment in the 1980s. At the forefront of the Chinese economy, both
cities had an urgent need to set up specialized institutions catering to the resolution of Sino-
foreign commercial disputes. As such, in response to the respective requests of the Shenzhen
and  Shanghai municipal governments and  their local  Party committees to make use of the
then existing resources in China, the two CIETAC sub-commissions were approved to be set
up in 1983 and 1988, respectively, by the State Council, through the assistance of application
by  the  CIETAC’s  organizer,  the  China  Council  for  Promotion  of  International  Trade
(CCPIT), attached to the State Council.92 
Studies show that  the  two CIETAC sub-commissions  were historically managed  under
their respective local governments and hence, were financially independent of the CIETAC
since  their  establishment;  the  name “sub-commission”  was largely a  professional  label.93
Nevertheless, the CIETAC attempted to strengthen its influence by appointing secretary gen-
erals and deputy secretary generals for and applying its rules to  the  two  sub-commissions
from 2002 until August 1, 2012.94 However, the impact of such actions was limited. Not only
was there a power struggle within management because the two sub-commissions were finan-
cially independent, but the CIETAC and the two sub-commissions were natural competitors
in the arbitration business for arbitration fees.95 This competition reached its zenith in 2012
when the CIETAC finally revised its rules, excluding the jurisdiction of the two sub-commis-
sions.
b. The CIETAC Split
On February 3, 2012, the CIETAC promulgated its revised Arbitration Rules (the “2012
Rules”) and announced their effectiveness on May 3, 2012. The taking into effect of the 2012
Rules was immediately followed by announcements from the Shenzhen and Shanghai sub-
commissions claiming independence from the CIETAC (referred to as the “CIETAC split” in
92   The CIETAC South China Sub-commission was set up in 1984 and the CIETAC Shanghai Sub-commission 
was set up in 1990. The CIETAC South China Sub-commission bore the name of the CIETAC Shenzhen office 
at its establishment in 1984. It was upgraded to the CIETAC Shenzhen Sub-commission in 1989 and had its 
name changed to the current one in 2004. For a history of their establishment, see Gao Fei (高菲), Mao zhong 
wei shang hai, hua nan liang fen hui yu mao zhong wei zhi zheng de fa lu wen ti yan jiu (san): mao zhong wei 
shang hai, hua nan liang fen hui wei fa du li de yuan yin yu jie jue (贸仲委上海华南两分后与贸仲委之争的法律问题研究（三）：贸仲委上海,华南两分会违法独立的原因与解决’) [Research on the Legal Issues of the 
Disputes Between the CIETAC Shanghai and Huanan Two Sub-commissions and the CIETAC (3): Reasons and 
Solution of the Illegal Independence of CIETAC Shanghai and Huanan Sub-commissions], 11 SHI DAI FA XUE 
(时代法学) [PRESENT-DAY L. & SCI.] 3, 6–11 (2013).
93   Id. at 6–7.
94   Id.
95   Id.
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the literature).96 The split is believed to have been triggered by the CIETAC’s 2012 Rules,
particularly article 2, which concerns the structure and jurisdictional power division between
the CIETAC headquarters in Beijing and its two sub-commissions.97 
Grouped under the heading “General Provisions,” article 2 of the 2012 Rules stipulates
that “CIETAC sub-commissions or arbitration centers are branches of CIETAC. They accept
arbitration applications and administer arbitration cases with CIETAC’s authorization.”98 For
cases submitted to CIETAC, there are three common types of jurisdiction clauses:
(a) The parties elect to submit the dispute to the CIETAC in Beijing (referred to 
as the “Headquarter Clause” in this Article);
(b) The parties elect to submit the dispute to a specified CIETAC sub-commission
(referred to as the “Sub-commission Clause”);
(c) The parties elect to submit the dispute to the “CIETAC, at the place of a 
specified sub-commission, or where the agreement on the sub-commission is 
ambiguous” (referred to as the “Mixed Clause”).99
Prior to May 1, 2012, the CIETAC and its two sub-commissions used the same set of ar-
bitration rules. Under the 2005 and 2000 versions of the CIETAC Rules, where a Headquarter
Clause or a Mixed Clause is used, parties have the right to submit their cases to either the CI-
ETAC headquarters in Beijing or the sub-commissions in Shenzhen/Shanghai, with the juris-
diction  finally  determined upon the claimant’s  first  choice.100 As for the sub-commission
96   See,  e.g.,  Meng Chen,  Is  CIETAC Breaking Apart? An Analysis  of  the Split  in  the CIETAC System,  6
CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 107 (2013).
97   Article 2 is entitled “The Structure and Duties.”  See  China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission Arbitration Rules, art. 2 (rev’d Feb. 3, 2014, effective May 1, 2012) (on file with author) [here-
inafter 2012 CIETAC Rules].
98   Id. art. 2(3).
99   Id. art. 2(6).
100   See Arbitration Rules of China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), art.
12 (revised and adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade and China Chamber of Interna-
tional Commerce, Sep. 5, 2000, effective Oct. 1, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2000 CIETAC Rules];
Arbitration Rules of China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), art. 2(8) (re-
vised and adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade and China Chamber of International
Commerce, Jan. 11, 2005, effective May 1, 2005),  available at  http://www1.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?
lib=law&id=4216 [hereinafter 2005 CIETAC Rules]. 
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clause, the specified sub-commission will handle the particular case.101 However, under the
2012 Rules, cases with the Headquarter Clause and the Mixed Clause would both be taken up
by the CIETAC headquarters in Beijing, whereas the two sub-commissions may only handle
cases with a clearly written Sub-commission Clause.102
Years of competition among the three institutions, catalyzed by changes to the jurisdic-
tional power division and associated impact on the sub-commissions’ income from case-fil-
ing fees – coupled with CIETAC’s declaration of effective control over the sub-commissions
– led to the announcement of independence by the sub-commissions.103 On August 1, 2012,
the CIETAC made a public announcement that it would terminate its authorization of the
Shanghai and South-China Sub-commissions’ jurisdictional power to accept and administrate
CIETAC-related arbitration cases; cases with a sub-commission clause would now all be ac-
cepted by the CIETAC headquarter in Beijing.104 In response, in addition to claiming inde-
pendence,  the two sub-commissions  also renamed themselves to the South China Interna-
tional Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (SCIETAC)  in October 2012 and the
Shanghai  International  Economic  and  Trade  Arbitration  Commission  (SIETAC)  in  April
2013.105 In May 2013, the SIETAC and the SCIETAC each announced a complete new set of
101   Article 12 of the 2000 CIETAC Rules; Article 2(8) of the 2005 CIETAC Rules.
102   2012 CIETAC Rules, supra note 98, art. 2(6).
103   China’s leading economic news media, Yicai.com, reported on the “CIETAC split episode.” See Xiao Yao, 
Lu Litao & Guo Liqin (萧遥，卢丽涛，郭丽琴), She wai zhong cai nao “fen zhi”: zheng yi bei hou shen fen 
cheng mi ( “ ”涉外仲裁闹“分治”：争议背后身份成谜 分治”：争议背后身份成谜 ：争议背后身份成谜) [Foreign Arbitration “Divided”: Identities Behind the 
Controversy Remain a Mystery], YICAI.COM (May 4, 2012), 
http://www.yicai.com/news/2012/05/1691426.html.
104   Zhong guo guo ji jing ji mao yi zhong cai wei yuan hui guan yu yue ding you zhong guo guo ji jing ji mao yi
zhong cai we yuan hui shang hai fen hui, zhong guo guo ji jing ji mao yi zhong cai wei yuan hui hua nan fen hui
zhong cai de an jian de guan li gong gao (中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会关于约定由中国国际经济贸易仲裁
委员会上海分会，中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会华南分会仲裁的案件的管理公告 ) [Administrative An-
nouncement by the CIETAC Regarding Arbitral Cases Submitted to the CIETAC Shanghai and South-China
Sub-commissions], CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N (Aug. 1, 2012) https://www.globalchinalaw.-
com/zh/documents/884ea283-5469-bba1-2054-c369b023054e/bilingual (accessed Oct. 25, 2017).
105   SIETAC and SCIETAC also use the new names of Shanghai International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) and 
Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA), respectively. For reports by China’s leading economic 
news media, Yicai.com, on the aftermath of the “CIETAC split,” see Lu Litao (卢丽涛), Hua nan guo zhong, 
shang hai mao zhong: Du li zhong cai ji gou bu cun zai shou quan zhi shuo (华南国仲，上海贸仲：独立仲裁
机构不存在授权之说) [South China, Shanghai Sub-commission: Authorization Implications for Independent 
Arbitral Bodies?], YICAI.COM (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.yicai.com/news/2013/01/2463616.html; Lu Litao 
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arbitration rules, which stated that  they would no longer accept  cases with a headquarter
clause, but would as usual accept cases with a sub-commission clause.106 
c. Consequence and Implications
As a result,  two conflicting positions on jurisdiction emerged. An immediate question
was whether previous agreements with a Subcommission Clause which had been submitted
to,  and accepted by,  the subcommissions prior to the split were still valid. It  was therefore
open to the respondent to make such a challenge to the court at either the jurisdictional or en-
forcement phase by making use of the confusion to argue that the original subcommissions
had no jurisdiction to arbitrate by virtue of the CIETAC announcement on August 1, 2012.
When faced with such applications, the courts mostly refused them in order to maintain sta-
bility in the arbitration regime. 
The uncertainty remained and the dispute was not resolved until the SPC issued its offi-
cial stance on September 4, 2013 (the “2013 Notice”).107 The 2013 Notice requested all cases
arising out of the jurisdictional dispute to be reported to the SPC and could only be decided
after a reply from the SPC has been obtained. There were at least two cases after the publica-
tion of the SPC’s 2013 Notice. The first case concerned the effect of the arbitral award fol-
lowing an arbitration agreement selecting the “CIETAC Shanghai Sub-commission” as the
arbitration institution. The Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court issued its judgment
on December 31, 2014, holding that since the Shanghai Sub-commission had changed its
name to SIETAC, the case should, and would be deemed to, have been accepted by the SI-
ETAC, and therefore the arbitration decision was effective.108 In a similar vein, the judgment
(卢丽涛), Shang hai mao zhong geng ming xia yue qi yong xin gui ze xin ming ce (上海贸仲更名：下月启用新
规则新名册) [Shanghai CIETAC Changed Name: New Rules and Lists to Be Adopted Next Month], YICAI.COM 
(Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.yicai.com/news/2013/04/2621445.html. 
106  See Lu Litao (卢丽涛), Shang hai mao zhong geng ming xia yue qi yong xin gui ze xin ming ce (上海贸仲更
名：下月启用新规则新名册) [Shanghai CIETAC Changed Name: New Rules and Lists to Be Adopted Next
Month], YICAI.COM (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.yicai.com/news/2013/04/2621445.html.
107   Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu zheng que shen li zhong cai si fa shen cha an jian you guan wen ti de tong
zhi (fa fa (2013) 194 hao) (最高人民法院关于正确审理仲裁司法审查案件有关问题的通知  （法发
（2013）194 号）) [SPC Notice on Certain Issues Relating to Correct Handling of Judicial Review of Arbitra-
tion Matters (Court Issuance No. 194 of 2013)] (promulgated by the  Sup. Ct., Sep. 4, 2013, effective Sep.4,
2013).
108  Hu er zhong min ren (zhong xie) zi di 5 hao cai ding shu (沪二中民认（仲协）字第 5 号民事裁定书) [Rul-
ing No. 5 on Civil Jurisdiction Arising out of Arbitration Agreement] < Civil Ruling No. 5 > (Shanghai No. 2
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rendered by the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court on January 13, 2015, also con-
firmed the jurisdiction of the SCIETAC.109 Both judgments were confirmed by the SPC. The
2013 SPC Notice, while praiseworthy for ensuring judicial oversight of such jurisdictional
conflicts, fell short of articulating the principle by which the appropriate forum would be de-
termined for arbitration pursuant to an affected clause.
More recently, on July 15, 2015, the SPC issued a further judicial interpretation on the
matter in the form of a reply to the Shanghai Higher People’s Court, the Jiangsu Higher Peo-
ple’s Court, and the Guangdong Higher People’s Court (the “2015 Reply”).110 The 2015 Re-
ply offers guidance as to which institution should exercise jurisdiction and under what cir-
cumstances. This reply, effective as of July 17, 2015, splits the timeline into three time peri-
ods:
(1) before the renaming of the sub-commission as a result of the split (the “pre-
renaming period”); 
(2) on the date or after the renaming but before the effective date of the 2015 
Reply (the “transition period”); and 
(3) after the effective date (the “new period”). 
Hence, for arbitration agreements made in the pre-renaming period and submitted to ei-
ther of the sub-commissions, the SIETAC and the SCIETAC would have jurisdiction over the
case.111 If, however, the arbitration agreement was entered into in the transitional or the new
period, the CIETAC would have jurisdiction.112 All of these rules sent the same signal that ar-
bitration agreements should be given effect as far as possible where parties have acted rea-
sonably in their designation of arbitration institutions. Commentators have noted that, by do-
Intermediate People’s Ct., Dec. 31, 2014). 
109   Jing er zhong te zi di 08088 hao min shi cai ding shu  (京二中特字第 08088 号民事裁定书) [Civil Ruling
No. 08088] <Civil Ruling No. 08088> (Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Ct., Apr. 4, 2014). The Beijing
Court recognized that the CIETAC South China Sub-commission was established in 1984 in accordance with
law and had its name changed to SCIETAC, and the parties in the case had made a clear designation of the arbi-
tration institution. Therefore the arbitration application shall be made to SCIETAC in accordance with law.
110   The Supreme People’s Court Released Reply on the Judicial Supervision and Review of the Jurisdiction and
Arbitral Awards in Cases Involving Arbitration Agreements for Arbitration at the CIETAC South China Sub-
Commission and the CIETAL Shanghai Sub-Commission, CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N (Jul. 17,
2015), http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Article&a=show&id=2517&l=en.
111   Id. art. 1(1).
112   Id. art. 1(2)– (3).
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ing so, the SPC has mitigated the side effects of the CIETAC split and maintained stability
and clarity in the arbitration market.113 Together with the aforementioned cases, which were
tactically handled pursuant to the 2013 Notice, the SPC guidelines confirmed the jurisdiction
of the SIETAC and the SCIETAC, and the jurisdictional  battle following the CIETAC split
has finally been resolved. 
The  CIETAC jurisdictional  battle indicates that the unrivaled position held by the CI-
ETAC in the Chinese arbitration system is also susceptible to challenges. As discussed earlier
in this Article, the CIETAC has, to a certain extent, been monopolizing the foreign-related ar-
bitration market in China despite the proliferation of local arbitration committees and the ef-
fect of the 1996 Notice which removed the jurisdictional bifurcation. The SCIETAC’s and
the SIETAC’s declaration of independence posed new challenges to the CIETAC, particu-
larly because, by promulgating new arbitration rules, the SCIETAC and the SIETAC have
quickened their pace to match international standards. They utilized various advantages and
features that are unique to themselves, such as being located in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone
and the Guangdong Free Trade Zone, respectively, and since the “split episode,” have created
fierce competition for the CIETAC. For example, the SCIETAC has made full use of its ad-
vantageous location “next door” to Hong Kong and Macau. Out of the thirty-four foreign ar-
bitration awards enforced by Hong Kong courts in 2014, five of them were awards rendered
by the SCIETAC, just slightly lower than the number of awards determined by the Hong
Kong International Arbitration Center, which was eight.114 This new dynamic of arbitration
commissions using their niche to compete with each other has also extended to local arbitra-
tion commissions as will be discussed in the following subsection. 
2. Rising Competition Among Local Arbitration Commissions
Multiple factors determine how the market of Chinese local arbitration commissions has
formed, expanded, matured, complicated, and become increasingly competitive over the past
decade. These factors include the proliferation of local arbitration commissions following the
promulgation of the 1994 AL, their capacity to arbitrate non-domestic arbitral cases pursuant
to the 1996 State Council Notice, the desire to attract foreign cases in the “shadow” of the CI-
113   For an example, see comments by foreign law firms such as Norton Rose: China Arbitration: New Judicial
Guidance on the CIETAC Split,  NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Aug. 2015),  http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
knowledge/publications/131227/china-arbitration-new-judicial-guidance-on-the-cietac-split .
114   The Enforcement of SCIA Arbitration Awards Ranked as Highest in Hong Kong , S. CHINA INT’L ECON. &
TRADE ARB.  COMM’N/SHENZHEN CT.  INT’L ARB. (Jan.  30, 2015),  http://www.sccietac.org/web/news/detail/
1518.html.
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ETAC, and moreover, their continuing efforts to foster institutional independence, integrity,
and competitiveness. Some better-developed local arbitration commissions now have the in-
centive, the potential, and even the capacity to compete against the traditional giants in the
field such as the CIETAC, as well as among themselves. 
One strategy adopted by the local arbitration commissions to enhance their competitive-
ness is to regularly update their arbitration rules. Three main features usually accompany rule
amendments. First, to attract overseas cases and to compete with the CIETAC, local arbitral
commissions have the incentive to internationalize their arbitration rules, i.e., to amend their
rules to bring them in line with international arbitration norms and standards. In this respect,
the amendments have focused on enhancing the transparency and efficiency of the arbitration
processes, as well as paying greater respect to parties’ procedural autonomy and flexibility.
For example, the most recently updated BAC Arbitration Rules of 2015 specifically include a
chapter  on  “Special  Provisions  for  International  Commercial  Arbitration”  (Chapter  VIII),
which introduces certain rules with regard to the interim measures of protection115 and emer-
gency arbitrators,116 in addition to specifying increased scope and general flexibility of proce-
dural  measures.117 Similar  efforts  have been observed in local  arbitration  commissions  in
comparatively economically better-developed Chinese cities such as Guangzhou.118
Second, to enhance their competitive edge, some local commissions seek to achieve a
higher degree of professionalism. Privileged by its location in Beijing—the capital of China,
as well as the crown of the country’s tertiary education and research—the BAC is particularly
well known for reaching out to and recruiting new talents in law, economics, technology, and
trade. I showed earlier in the Article in relation to the discussion on the commissions’ quest
for independence, the BAC’s arbitrators are mainly renowned scholars and leading profes-
sionals in the field. The BAC’s founding Chairman is Professor Jiang Ping, former President
of the China University of Political Science and Law and one of the most renowned jurists in
contemporary China since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The
BAC’s current Chairman is Professor Liang Huixing, another influential jurist in civil and
commercial  law in China today.119 Moreover, the BAC has maintained a tradition of high
115   BAC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 15, art. 62.
116   Id. art. 63.
117   Id. art. 35.
118   The Guangzhou Arbitration Commission (GAC) also started the process of amending its arbitration rules in
2015 for the enhancement of parties’ procedural autonomy and flexibility. 
119  Zhang Wei (张维), Jing wai zhong cai ji gou jin zhu zhong guo shi change jia ju jing zheng, Zhuang jia xu
fei xing zheng hua (境外仲裁机构进驻中国市场家具竞争，专家吁非行政化 ) [Foreign Arbitration Institu-
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elimination rate in the ranks of its arbitrators who have not taken up any cases in the past sev-
eral years (i.e., nonpracticing arbitrators). This elimination practice of the BAC is unprece-
dented in other arbitration institutions in China, such as the CIETAC or other leading local
arbitration commissions. By 2006, ten years after the establishment of the BAC, 586 arbitra-
tors had ceased to be employed, which reflects the intense competition among the BAC panel
arbitrators.120 In the meantime, the BAC has strongly encouraged arbitrators to utilize their
professional talents and skills to compete for the opportunity of handling cases. In 2013, 267
out of the 391 BAC panel arbitrators were involved in handling arbitration cases; just one out
of the fifty-seven arbitrators newly appointed that year did not have a chance to handle a sin-
gle case.121 Additionally, the BAC places strict ethical restrictions on its arbitrators to act as
counsel in other cases submitted to the BAC; it is the only arbitration institution in China that
has such a prohibition.122 This prohibition seeks to ensure the ethical conduct and integrity of
BAC  arbitrators,  in  order  to  offset  the  side-effects  of  personal  relations  and  networks
(guanxi), prevalent and/or latent in the context of arbitral tribunals in China.123 
Third, local arbitration commissions pursue various initiatives to make use of their best
local features to attract cases in a competitive arbitration market. While the BAC focuses on
attracting talent and building professionalism to gain recognition both at home and abroad,
city-based arbitration commissions elsewhere also work hard to look for a competitive edge
by developing their own attributes. In June 2015, at the capital city of South China’s Guang-
dong Province  and one  of  China’s  richest  cities,  Guangzhou,  the  Guangzhou Arbitration
Commission (GAC) published its Internet Arbitration Rules, as part of an attempt to promote
tions Enter The Chinese Market Increasing Competition, Experts Calling for Removal of Administrative Inter-
ference], Fa zhi ri bao (《法制日报》》) (Sept. 29, 2015), available at (中新网-财经) CHINANEWS.COM http://
www.chinanews.com/m/cj/2015/09-29/7549384.shtml.
120   Bei zhong shi zhou nian gong zuo zong jie (北仲十周年工作总结) [Beijing Arbitration Commission Ten-
Year Anniversary Work Summary],  Bei  jing zhong cai  wei  yuan hui (北京仲裁委员会 )  [BEIJING ARB.
COMM’N] (SEP. 30. 2005), http://www.bjac.org.cn/page/gybh/sznzj.html.
121   Bei zhong 2013 nian gong zuo zong jie (北仲 2013年工作总结) [Beijing Arbitration Commission Work
Summary 2013], Bei jing zhong cai wei yuan hui (北京仲裁委员会) [BEIJING ARB. COMM’N] (JAN. 24, 2014),
http://www.bjac.org.cn/page/gybh/2013zj.html.
122   Bei zhong zhong cai yuan shou ze (北仲仲裁员守则) [Beijing Arb. Comm’n Code for Arbitrators] (rev’d
Aug. 14, 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.bjac.org.cn/page/zc/zcygf.html.
123   See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
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online arbitration as a selling point for parties to choose the GAC.124 In another provincial
capital and an important hub in Central China, the city of Wuhan of the Hubei Province, the
Wuhan Arbitration Commission (WAC) claims that its successful mediation (settlement) rate
for arbitration cases submitted to the WAC reached as high as 97.13% between 2002 and
2012, and that its arbitration caseload had been consistently ranked the highest among all
Chinese arbitration institutions within that decade.125 In Southeast China, in the city of Wen-
zhou of the Zhejiang Province—the hometown of private enterprises and the birthplace of
private financing in China—the Wenzhou Arbitration Commission (WEAC) has been focus-
ing on the promotion of financial arbitration services since local financial activities are active
and there is a large number of financial disputes in Wenzhou.126 In effect as of May 2015, the
newly promulgated WEAC Financial Arbitration Rules feature flexibility in application of fi-
nancial laws, norms,  customs, and rules in the financial profession, as well as  principles of
equity and fairness in the financial market, all of which are deemed to be admissible govern-
ing regulations in arbitrating financial disputes at WEAC.127 The Rules also aim to achieve a
maximum degree of convenience in arbitrating cross-border financial disputes.128 As such, the
Rules contain a special  chapter governing international and foreign financial arbitration ser-
vices.129 All  these  initiatives  are  a  manifestation  of  the  increasingly  intense  competition
among local commissions in the Chinese arbitration market; these institutional competitions
in turn push the Chinese arbitration system in the direction of qualitative advancement.
III. REFORM PATTERNS AND DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE
124   See Guang zhou zhong cai we yuan hui wang luo zhong cai gui ze (广州仲裁委员会网络仲裁规则) [2015
Guangzhou Internet Arbitration Rules] (promulgated by the Guangzhou Arb. Comm’n, June 6, 2015, effective
Oct.  1,  2015),  http://www.gzac.org/WEB_CN/AboutInfo.aspx?AboutType=4&KeyID=100b1ae3-9f15-4bfc-
bf59-a90273778fa5.
125   See Wu han zhong cai wei shou an shu lian xu shi nian wei ju quan guo di yi (武汉仲裁委受案数连续十年
位居全国第一) [Wuhan Arbitration Commission’s Arbitration Caseload Highest Among All Chinese Arbitra-
tion Institutions in Ten Continuous Years], CHANG JIANG RI BAO [长江日报] [YANGTZE RIVER DAILY] (Feb. 7,
2013),  reprinted  in  NEWS.IFENG.COM (Feb.  7,  2013),  http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/
detail_2013_02/07/22024260_0.shtml.
126   See Wen zhou zhong cai wei yuan hui jin rong zhong cai gui ze (温州仲裁委员会金融仲裁规则) [2015
Wenzhou Financial Arbitration Rules] (promulgated by the Wenzhou Arb. Comm’n, May 8, 2015, effective
May 8, 2015), http://www.wzac.org/News_Detail.aspx?CateID=18&ID=397.
127   Id. art. 12. 
128   Id. ch. 3.
129   Id. ch. 4.
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One very distinctive feature of the reform patterns of the Chinese arbitration system in
the past decade is that there has been little legislative development. Instead, courts and arbi-
tration commissions have been active in pushing forward judicial and institutional reforms,
which have been identified and analyzed in the foregoing subsections. 
A. Judicial and Institutional Efforts 
On the one hand, there have been important  judicial  interpretations and arbitral  judg-
ments that fill the gaps in the AL and clarify ambivalent aspects of arbitral practice. On the
other hand, an arbitration market in China has emerged and competition among Chinese arbi-
tration commissions has become even fiercer, pushing for the independence, professionalism,
and internationalization of the institution-based Chinese arbitration system. Both judicial and
institutional developments are commendable efforts at reform, as they tend to address the de-
fects of the different aspects of the Chinese arbitration system. 
As I outlined earlier, in China, the SPC serves a dual function as the highest court as well
as  a  de  facto  rulemaking  power-holder  through  the  issuance  of  judicial  interpretations.
Whether it is the adjudication of individual cases or the issuance of more general judicial in-
terpretations, the SPC helps clarify controversial legal issues where existing legislation fails
to provide clear or satisfactory solutions. In turn, judicial efforts help ensure a smooth and
stable operation of the arbitration system in China from a macro regulatory and supervisory
perspective. For example, the 2006 SPC Interpretation clarifies what amounts to an “unclear
yet curable designation of arbitration commissions” as required by articles 16 and 18 of the
AL. On the adjudication side, the  Longlide  judgment, together with the  Duferco  judgment,
give effect to the possibility and the potential  of foreign institutional arbitration seated in
China, an issue which is omitted from the legislation but much debated in arbitral practice.
The power of the judiciary to clarify and supplement legislation, or even to “make laws,” is
particularly significant to the reform of the fast-developing world of arbitration in China, as
laws usually lag behind the pace of economic development. Moreover, because legislative re-
forms, such as promulgation of a new law or amendment to existing laws, require rigid proce-
dure and usually take a long time, the judiciary is in the position to respond to and resolve le-
gal issues arising out of the day-to-day changing circumstances of the stakeholders quicker
than the legislature is able to. As a result, the judiciary, in particular the SPC, has been able to
contribute to legal aspects of the reform of the Chinese arbitration system both on a case-by-
case and issue-by-issue basis and in more generic terms of wider application. 
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In comparison, the institutional efforts by arbitration commissions to reform the Chinese
arbitration system have a very different focus. Unlike the judiciary, which is a public power-
holder performing a dual regulatory and supervisory role, arbitration commissions are “pri-
vate institutions” (民间机构, minjian jigou) in China, or at least intend to be private (民间性,
minjianxing).  As such, they are competitors  in the arbitration market.  Indeed, the driving
force behind the reform initiatives by these arbitration commissions is their desire to enhance
institutional competitiveness, which is intensified by their aim to attain self-independence and
self-sufficiency. With market competition as the underlying incentive for reform, institutional
initiatives generally revolve around measures and actions taken by each individual Chinese
arbitration commission to improve its internal quality and external image. As observed, insti-
tutional competitions in the Chinese arbitration market are generally twofold. First, there are
aggressive competitions  among Chinese city-based local  arbitration  commissions,  particu-
larly in economically better-developed cities. Second, city-based arbitration commissions, in-
cluding the former CIETAC subcommissions (in Shenzhen and Shanghai) and other fast-de-
veloping local arbitration commission (such as the BAC), have all become potent rivals to the
CIETAC.  Correspondingly,  there  is  the  aforementioned  phenomenon  of  local  arbitration
commissions engaging in the proactive amendment of their arbitration rules with the aim of
professionalization and internationalization, as well as of building on their local advantages
in terms of talent, economy, technology, geographic advantages, etc. In a similar vein, the ac-
tions taken by the SIETAC and the SCIETAC following the CIETAC split is another mani-
festation  of  how previous  CIETAC commonwealth  partners  now strive to  compete  for  a
larger share of the CIETAC legacy in the arbitration market. To sum up, institutional initia-
tives by each individual arbitration commission can be described, or collectively understood,
as  improving  the  culture  dynamics  of  the  Chinese  arbitration  regime  in  the  direction  of
achieving integrity and competitiveness,  and eventually,  reforming the Chinese arbitration
system macroscopically in terms of its qualitative rather than quantitative development.130
B. Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Reforms
The impact of the judicial and institutional reforms is examined and compared above in
terms of the different focuses in addressing defects of the existing Chinese arbitration system.
In fact, another feature distinguishing the judiciary from institutional initiatives is the way in
130   The Chinese arbitration regime has been criticized as overdeveloped in terms of number of arbitration insti-
tutions. The establishment of over 230 arbitration commissions across Chinese cities has been criticized as ex-
cessive and catering to administrative needs rather than real market demand. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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which they hold sway over the other stakeholders in the arbitration system, as well as the ex-
tent of their influence, the former being top-down while the latter bottom-up. 
A top-down approach has a wide and direct scope of application in the sense that inter-
pretations or judgments rendered by the SPC would be binding (or highly influential)131 on
future arbitration practices pertaining to the same (or similar) types of issues in China. In con-
trast, any changes made by a bottom-up initiative, such as those taken by individual arbitra-
tion commissions, are prima facie limited to that specific institution. For instance, an arbitra-
tion rule amendment by the BAC would only be applicable to the BAC itself, but not to any
other local  arbitration commission;  nor would it  impact  Chinese arbitration institutions at
large or Chinese arbitral practice in general. Hence, while top-down measures have a direct
impact on the reform, bottom-up initiatives may only influence the arbitration system through
indirect means, such as changing the landscape of the arbitration market and its culture, dy-
namics in competition. Despite their indirect influence, bottom-up initiatives by individual ar-
bitration commissions are by no means less important to the reform of the Chinese arbitration
system. An evident advantage is that these commissions are at the forefront of Chinese arbi-
tral practice and, hence, they are more sensitive to the market needs of both domestic and in-
ternational arbitration businesses (disputes) and users (disputants). Likewise, they have the
flexibility and capacity to respond to issues arising out of the changing circumstances of the
arbitration business much more quickly than the legislature or the judiciary. This feature of
the bottom-up commission-by-commission reform pattern is significant, as China is still at
the fledging level of its arbitration development, and local arbitration commissions are able to
identify the limitations and defects of the system more aptly, follow recent legal and commer-
cial trends more closely, and align themselves with international norms and standards more
flexibly. 
The most expected top-down reform is the revision of the 1994 AL. Without revamping
the legislation, even the SPC is sometimes at a loss when it comes to pushing the boundaries
of the practice. For example, in the aforementioned Longlide case, although the SPC recog-
nized the validity of the disputed arbitration clause, the court did not go on to address the is-
sue  of  the  scope  of  application  of  the  New York  Convention  in  China  in  controversial
131   China is a civil law jurisdiction, in which judicial decisions are not binding precedents (stare decisis), unlike
in common law jurisdictions. However, it has been a general practice in China that SPC judgments are consid-
ered highly influential (or highly persuasive) on subsequent rulings of the same (or similar) issues; lower-court
adjudicators are reluctant to deviate from SPC precedents due to the appellate system. 
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cases.132 Unsurprisingly, the judgment met with some criticism. It remains unclear whether
arbitral awards rendered by foreign institutional arbitration seated in China should be catego-
rized as “non-domestic” awards in China, and moreover, whether such awards can be en-
forced by Chinese courts pursuant to the New York Convention (or whether the New York
Convention could be extended to enforcement of “non-domestic” awards rendered in China),
particularly in light of the reservations China made in acceding to the Convention. It seems
that the SPC “intentionally” chose to be hands-off on the issue even though it had the oppor-
tunity to get involved, since the issue was raised by the applicant’s counsel in Longlide. This
deliberate reluctance to touch the red line may stem from the SPC’s hesitancy in blatantly
creating new laws in areas where the legislation (i.e., the AL) is silent and where the impact
would be huge. In this particular case, to legally recognize the outcome of foreign institu-
tional arbitration seated in China would have a huge impact on the Chinese arbitration mar-
ket, as well as the Chinese legal market, including the extent of market freedom and the open-
ness in allowing market accession of quasi-judicial  overseas service providers.  Therefore,
even though the SPC inclines toward recognizing the growing phenomena in arbitral practice
and towards granting the parties more autonomy in drafting, it  is cautious about bringing
changes  and  reforms  too  radically  and  swiftly.  As  previously  concluded,  in  the  case  of
Longlide, the SPC displayed a sympathetic and liberal attitude by recognizing the validity of
the disputed arbitration clause, yet played safe, and chose not to deal with the more contro-
versial issues such as the nature, categorization, and enforceability of arbitral awards flowing
from foreign institutional arbitration seated in China, as well as associated questions regard-
ing the proper approach and scope of application of the New York Convention in unconven-
tional cases.
Lastly but importantly, given the different mechanisms whereby top-down and bottom-up
initiatives work and impact on the arbitration regime, these initiatives play complementary
roles in the development of the arbitration system in China. How the two types of reform pat-
terns interact with each other can in fact be observed in some of the examples upon closer ex-
amination. To illustrate, the issuance of the 2013 and 2015 SPC Notices in response to the
question of the validity of arbitration agreements and awards affected by the CIETAC split is
one manifestation of bottom-up initiatives by arbitration commissions to push forward top-
132   An hui long li de bao zhuang yin shua you xian gong si yu BP Agnati S.R.L. (安徽龙利得包装印刷有限公
司与被申请人 BP Agnati S.R.L.) [BP Agnati S.R.L Longlide Packaging Co. v. BP Agnati S.R.L.] [2013] Wan
Min Er Ta Zi No. 00001 ([2013] 皖民二他字第 00001 号)> (Anhui Higher People’s Ct. Jan. 30, 2013). See also
Supra note 86.
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down judicial actions at the central level. It is encouraging to note that the top-down and bot-
tom-up initiatives have been working together and responding to each other, such that they
can complementarily bring about holistic measures to remedy practical defects of the Chinese
arbitration system. Hence, to respond to the bottom-up, market-driven jurisdictional diversifi-
cation post the CIETAC split incident, the 2015 SPC Notice gives effect to all reasonably
drafted arbitration agreements from a top-down and regulatory perspective. More fundamen-
tally, it is expected that the most important top-down reform, i.e., the 1994 AL, will be revis-
ited. As noted above, it is very likely that legislative changes will take place in the not-too-
distant future.
C. Penetrating Factors in Arbitration Development
A comparative analysis of Asia-Pacific arbitration development that focuses on the pene-
trating factors of arbitration development – rather than the influence of legal system (i.e. civil
law versus common law) or legal jurisdiction (i.e. unitary versus federal)133 – shows that the
most relevant aspects of the development path of Chinese arbitration are China’s transitional
but fast-developing economy and a comparatively weaker rule of law from its administrative-
governance system rooted in history.
On the one hand, as outlined above, Chinese arbitration commissions, in particular city-
based local commissions, have been tolerated so far by administrative controls of the local
government,  and have been expecting legislative reform to embrace the real “private  and
market” nature of their institutional foundation and development.134 The desire has become
particularly strong since the SPC published its important judicial interpretations and arbitral
judgments in the past decade (the so-called “judicial efforts” at reform referred to in this Arti-
cle). On the other hand, as there has been no definite timetable set in the national legislative
agenda for the revision of the AL, some more developed frontline arbitration commissions
have made the best of their strengths (such as talent, economy, technology, locality) to mod-
ernize the rules (the so-called “institutional efforts” at reform referred to in this Article). De-
133   For example, among the wave of arbitration reform and development in Asia Pacific jurisdictions, Aus -
tralia’s case shows the most prevalent aspect of the reform as inherited through the influence of the common law
legal tradition and strong rule of law tradition. Australia owes its success in arbitration reform (in particular, the
amendment of the International Arbitration Act in 2010) to its response to the federal system of jurisdiction. See
Leon Trakman, Australia’s Contribution to International Commercial Arbitration in Asia (paper presented at the
“Developing  World  of  Arbitration:  A  Comparative  Study  of  the  Arbitration  Reform  in  Asia  Pacific
Conference,” University of Hong Kong, Oct. 27, 2015) (on file with author).
134   See discussions, supra Part I.B.2.
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spite the fact that arbitration commission rules do not carry the force of law and cannot over-
come deficiencies in the legal framework which are based on China’s socioeconomic and ad-
ministrative-governance situation, they do promote the practice of arbitration, facilitate the
legislative progress, and foster the development trend. 
In the interim period, where the AL has not been officially revamped, a significant fea-
ture of the patterns of China’s arbitration reform has been a mixture of the interim top-down
judicial (from the SPC) and bottom-up institutional efforts (from the Chinese arbitration com-
missions). Between the two, due to the rapidly developing economy and the associated de-
mand for dispute resolution arising out of the growing number and sophistication of commer-
cial disputes, the market-driven, bottom-up institutional initiatives have become a persuasive
force of the Chinese arbitration development patterns, to push forward top-down reforms, ei-
ther from the central judiciary or the legislature. The judicial efforts at the central level and
institutional efforts at the local level are then seen to collectively push forward positive re-
sponses from state legislation, i.e., the AL revision. As revealed by the Longlide case, without
legislative recognition, any reform efforts, whether top-down or bottom-up, judicial or insti-
tutional, would be “transitional” and “informal” and ineffective in bringing systematic break-
throughs. 
IV. PROGNOSIS AND PROSPECTIVE REFORMS
Echoing the reform patterns and the discussion of development evoked above, this Part
puts forward detailed proposals for reforming the Chinese arbitration system in a holistic
manner. It further identifies “essential” and “highly recommended” ingredients in arbitration
modernization and applies those to the Chinese context in suggesting specific reform propos-
als in the arbitration system and development.
A. Legislative Revision and Pro-Arbitration Judiciary
As an “essential” ingredient of the modern arbitration reform, the current AL (1994 AL)
should be revisited, as it has been proven to be outdated, creating obstacles to the Chinese ar-
bitration system and its general development. The Chinese legislative reform should reach
two dimensions of objectives: externally, to align with international arbitration norms, and in-
ternally, to achieve consistency with other sources of arbitral regulations in China.
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At an  international  level,  the  Chinese  legislature  should  take  advantage  of  the  2006
amended version of the Model Law,135 which is widely considereda reflection of international
best practices in arbitration and the adoption of which is considered a primary gateway to the
international arbitration market.136 The very reason for taking advantage of these best prac-
tices is because it is this author’s firm belief that the Chinese arbitration legislation has the
capability to grow to an international level, as has already happened in the case of the regime
of intellectual property laws.137 Arbitration is important to the commercial sector and it serves
the nation’s trade and investment interests.
At the domestic level, the Chinese legislature should review the various sources of arbi-
tration regulations to ensure consistency. As has been discussed previously, there are a num-
ber of evident inconsistencies between the AL and other types of arbitral regulation in China.
For example, the lack of detail in guiding the creation of local arbitration commissions has al-
lowed State Council regulations to intervene, producing contrary effects and hindering the
quest for independence of China’s city-based local arbitration commissions. Additionally, the
concept of “foreign-related arbitration commission” in the AL has become obsolete by virtue
of  the  1996 State  Council  Notice  bridging the  jurisdictional  bifurcation.  As there  are  no
longer any jurisdictional divisions predicated on the characterization of arbitration commis-
sions, the concept of “foreign-related commission” should be discarded to prevent any practi-
cal confusion. Only the concept of “foreign-related arbitration”138 should be retained, and bi-
135   The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)  Model Law on International
Commercial  Arbitration was  adopted  in  June  1985,  and  was  comprehensively  amended  in  July 2006;  See
UNICTRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2006),  https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf. 
136   For example, Australia is one of the first to adopt the 2006 amendments to the Model Law, as a reflection of
embracing international best practice.  See generally DOUG JONES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN AUSTRALIA
(2d ed. 2012); RICHARD GARNETT & LUKE NOTTAGE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN AUSTRALIA (2010).
137   The most recent laws have been aligned with various international conventions on the protection of intellec-
tual property rights. See Zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhu zuo quan fa (中华人民共和国著作权法) [Copy-
right Law] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, rev’d Feb. 26, 2010; effective
as from Apr. 1, 2010) <Order No.26 of the President> (China); Zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhuan li fa (中
华人民共和国专利法) [Patent Law] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 1, 1985, rev’d
Dec. 27, 2008; effective as from Oct. 1, 2009) <Order No. 8 of the President> (China); Zhong hua ren min gong
he guo shang biao fa (中华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l Peo-
ple’s Cong., Mar. 1, 1983, rev’d Aug. 30, 2013; effective as from May 1, 2014) <Order No. 6 of the President>
(China). 
138   The concept as in accordance with judicial interpretations of both the General Principles of Civil Law and
Civil Procedure Law.
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furcations should only be maintained to the extent that different treatment of judicial review
over arbitral awards may result from the two types of disputes; and grounds for reviewing do-
mestic awards should be narrowed only to procedural aspects.
Equally important in the revamping of the Chinese arbitration system and another “essen-
tial” ingredient to a successful arbitration reform is to have a pro-arbitration judiciary, which
is critical to ensuring the success of the goals of legislative reforms. It is encouraging to note
that, over the past decade, in addition to issuing the very impressive and consolidated Inter-
pretation on the Arbitration Law in 2006, the SPC has been generally supportive of arbitra-
tion in concrete practice as well. For example, in the most recent case on foreign institutional
arbitration seated in China, Longlide (2013), as well as in treating the jurisdictional mess post
the CIETAC split episode (2015), the central-level judiciary has exhibited judicial leniency
and made great efforts to give effect to arbitration agreements as much as possible. Lower-
level Chinese judiciaries are expected to learn from the SPC’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence
and to well implement it in their day-to-day practice.
B. Institutional Reform for Independence and Competitiveness
Measures to achieve institutional independence and competitiveness of Chinese arbitra-
tion commissions are aspects of “near” ingredients of the modern arbitration system, but will
be of particular significance and relevance to China as an institution-arbitration-dominated
jurisdiction. The institutional reform aims to comprehensively restructure the players of the
Chinese arbitration market and by doing so, Chinese arbitration commissions will develop on
basis of market demand rather than administrative needs.
Structurally, arbitration commissions must be decoupled from local governments and be
independent and self-sufficient. This purports to eliminate the external intervention by politi-
cal  and  administrative  powers  into  arbitration  commissions.  The  personnel  composition
within a commission, particularly that of its leadership, should be selected from legal profes-
sionals rather than representatives of administrative departments. In financial matters, arbitra-
tion commissions should rely on their arbitration fees charged for operation and development,
rather than remaining under the protection of local governments. 
Self-sufficiency is necessary not just for the sake of establishing the independence of
large numbers of city-based local arbitration commissions in China; it will also push them to
strive  for  quality  development  under  healthy  market  competition.  The  local  government
should be prohibited from forcing local enterprises to use local arbitration commissions to
play upon localization sentiment. In this regard, it is refreshing to see that the BAC has suc-
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cessfully restructured itself in terms of both integrity and quality; it has further won rising re-
pute in professionalism in the arbitration market. In the meantime, it should be noted that the
success of the BAC has not been easy; it would be wrong to assume that all other city-based
arbitration commissions could follow suit without the benefit of a demanding market. In fact,
as highlighted previously, many city-based local arbitration commissions were established on
the basis of administrative needs rather than market demand, meaning that the proposed re-
structuring, aimed at fostering independence and market competitiveness, might hinder their
long-term survival. Without arbitration cases or parties willing to opt for an arbitration com-
mission, any institutional reform endeavors are doomed to fail. One must also admit that the
active competition in the Chinese arbitration market is an inevitable trend and will become
even more intense in markets where only the fittest arbitral service providers will survive.
Hence, less developed local arbitration commissions, which have very small caseloads to sup-
port their operations, will likely be eliminated from the market. 
C. Marching Toward Arbitrator Professionalism
A last aspect of the prospective reforms concerns the quality of arbitrators. “An arbitra-
tion is only as good as the arbitrator.”139 In association with the modernization of Chinese ar-
bitration  commissions,  the  gradual  evolution  toward  arbitrator  professionalism  in  China
should be treated as another aspect of the “highly recommended” ingredient and an integral
part of the success of the reform. 
This would require that first, arbitrators must hold high standards of professional ability
and moral integrity; and second, China must establish an environment for the arbitrators to
work impartially. For the former, the AL does set out professional requirements that are no
lower than any other jurisdictions, but the accreditation is controlled by each individual arbi-
tration commission. As such, a change in the accreditation scheme is necessary to put forward
incentives to attract arbitral talents. It is desirable that the accreditation scheme be managed
by a self-regulatory body. In this respect, the China Arbitration Association (CAA) is the
most appropriate authority for qualifying arbitrators, given its legal status allowing it to coor-
dinate all Chinese arbitration commissions.140 Because China has not had a tradition of arbi-
139   Every arbitration aficionado knows this expression: “An arbitration is only as good as the arbitrator” (“Tant
vaut l’arbitre, tant vaut l’arbitrage”). The expression is widely referred to in the arbitration industry, see, e.g.,
Stephen R. Bond, The International Arbitrator: From the Perspective of the ICC International Court of Arbitra-
tion, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 1 (1991).
140   Zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa (中华人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 15(2),  reported in 7
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trator professionalism, further experience can be drawn from self-regulatory international ar-
bitral bodies such as the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) with respect to examining
and training Chinese and foreign nationals and helping them become accredited and remain
competent.141 
For the latter requirement regarding the supportive environment for arbitrators to work
professionally and impartially, one deciding factor is whether the arbitration commission it-
self is independent of administrative and other interference; the issue ties in the above discus-
sion on reform for institutional independence and integrity of Chinese arbitration commis-
sions. It would also require a strong set of arbitration rules, both professional and ethical, to
regulate and supervise the practice of arbitrators to ensure they act impartially. The repute
and popularity of the BAC in arbitrator professionalism is built particularly built on its suc-
cess in achieving institutional independence in the first place. The BAC’s experience is re-
search-oriented and may be used as an important example for other city-based local arbitra-
tion commissions to follow suit. With the CAA taking the lead in accreditation (in order to at-
tract talents), and individual arbitration commissions ensuring institutional independence and
competitiveness (in order to keep the talent), it is expected that arbitrator professionalism can
be established in China in the not too distant future.
CONCLUSION
While  every jurisdiction has a story to tell  in arbitral studies, particularly because the
field is fast changing and closely connected with economic development, the arbitration ar-
rangements established by China stand out as the most distinctive among major trading na-
tions—in theory, law, institutions, practice, and moreover, reform patterns and development
discourse.
In the Western world, where arbitration is widely favored by the international business
community, arbitration laws culminate from the jurisprudence of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration. Independent and competitive arbitration institutions
are created by chambers of commerce to facilitate business dispute resolution following the
norms and principles designated by the arbitration laws. In order to catch up with the Western
trend and to transform into favorable forums for international business dispute resolution,
Asian jurisdictions started to reform their arbitration systems on basis of the Model Law and
CHINA L. & PRAC. 23, 23–27 (1994).
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modern arbitration institutions during the 1990s. Since the Chinese Arbitration Law was pro-
mulgated in 1994, the Chinese experiment in arbitration modernization has met varied prob-
lems. As a developing rule of law jurisdiction, the administrative governance system of arbi-
tration originally practiced in China clashes with the autonomous and independent principle
of international arbitration; moreover, China’s regulatory system of arbitration is very much
scattered and still developing. 
As argued, the “essential” ingredient for the arbitration reform in China is its readiness to
formally revamp the most important regulatory framework, i.e., the 1994 Arbitration Law,
which has proved to be “Chinese characteristically localized” and unable to cope with the
rapidly deepening marketization and evolving rule of law conditions in China. The Model
Law provides and facilitates access to an international arbitration market and serves China’s
trade and investment interests. As a jurisdiction which has never incorporated the Model Law
(neither the 1985 version nor the 2006 amended version), legislative reform in line with the
Model Law standards should be taken place in China’s arbitral regime soon. The lack of offi-
cial legislative support has left the judicial and institutional initiatives (the informal patterns
of reform and more piecemeal developments) with many uncertainties. Relatedly, China may
lose its competitive value in the international arbitration market because of its overly slow
progress in macro-legislative development, despite its strong vigor in economic competitive-
ness. 
Fortunately, the situation is not without dynamic development. Though distinctive in its
reform patterns, the Chinese arbitration regime has been most vibrant over the past decade in
some “highly recommended” ingredients needed for arbitration modernization such as having
the “pro-arbitration judiciary” and “arbitration market with institutional reforms for competi-
tiveness”. As this Article has pointed out, the seeds of reform can be discerned from both bot-
tom-up and top-down perspectives, with judicial and institutional initiatives combined as a
major driving force of development. The judiciary is now paying more deference to arbitra-
tion in China. Commendably, the SPC has issued the consolidated 2006 Judicial Interpreta-
tion on Arbitration Law, which carries the effect of injecting more certainty into the defective
regulatory framework. Moreover, in recent years, the Chinese courts (both at the central and
local levels) have been relaxing their conditions and becoming increasingly receptive to for-
eign institutional  arbitration  seated in China.  All  these judicial  efforts  share the common
themes of fostering a more pro-arbitration attitude in the Chinese judiciary as well as aligning
Chinese arbitration norms and practices with international standards. On the other hand, two
decades following the promulgation of the Arbitration Law, the Chinese arbitration market is
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well-established and developed. The ever intensifying competition among city-based local ar-
bitration commissions and between these commissions and the CIETAC has formed another
important force behind arbitration reform in China, fostering institutional independence, in-
tegrity,  professionalism,  and  competitiveness  of  the  Chinese  arbitration  market  players,
namely the arbitration commissions. In this respect, the BAC has become a national leader in
institutional reform, with other developed city-based Chinese arbitration commissions follow-
ing suit and pursuing innovation. The CIETAC itself has also been taking a more active role
in bolstering trust following the dramatic split episode and the SPC’s actions giving effect to
post-split jurisdictions. 
This Article has further attempted, in many ways, to contextualize the Chinese distinc-
tions (in the arbitration system and its reform) in light of the wider social and economic real-
ity in China. By identifying the most recent homegrown Chinese experiences in arbitration 
reform (patterns and discourse), in prospect, the road ahead is for these judicial and institu-
tional initiatives to push for formal legislative breakthrough to confirm the informal initia-
tives. In the meantime, the legislative reform should incorporate international “best stan-
dards” of arbitration norms and practices so that the Chinese arbitration regime can truly ma-
ture and reach a global level. The formation of a modern and liberal arbitration environment 
is still critical to China’s trade and investment interests. Given China’s rapidly expanding 
economic prominence and ever-closer cooperation with global corporations, both at home 
and abroad, the number of international disagreements involving Chinese entities is expected 
to continue to grow. In view of the lack of competence of Chinese courts and the reluctance 
of Chinese firms to put their fate in the hands of foreign courts, arbitration is still the best 
choice. The Chinese government should make a serious and continued commitment to the de-
velopment of China toward becoming a favorable international arbitration forum.
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